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Notes 
BAD APPLICATION OF A BAD STANDARD:  
THE BUNGLING OF GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH’S 
THIRD-PARTY CONSENT LAW 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is late one rainy evening and rookie police officer Donald 
Mackenzie is riding shotgun in a squad car with his veteran partner, 
Officer Charles Sheerington.1  A voice comes over the car’s radio and 
asks them to respond to a domestic violence complaint at a nearby 
residence.  Officers Donald and Charles arrive on the scene; Donald’s 
stomach churns as he responds to his first call.  The two quickly 
approach the door, conscious of their surroundings and cautiously 
surveying the situation.  The two stop in their tracks when the door 
opens and a female voice asks them to come inside the house.  Almost 
immediately, the grisly voice of a male co-tenant, in less-than-cordial 
language, commands them not to enter the premises. 
Slightly taken aback, Donald and Charles blankly stare at one 
another, and with the rain pounding down on their hats, both wonder 
how to proceed.  Their hearts race, knowing they have to make a 
decision promptly, but unsure of how to make that decision.  They 
wonder if they should evaluate the circumstances here, weighing 
variables such as whether the woman appears in imminent danger of 
harm; the chance that evidence will be destroyed if they honor the 
refusal of consent; and the protection of the male’s right to privacy.  
Should they consider the location of the male tenant and the precise 
wording of the male tenant’s refusal of consent, while additionally 
giving substantial weight to the social expectations of whether an 
ordinary guest would enter under these circumstances? 
Although such an extensive consideration of factors seems 
impractical in a potentially dangerous situation, if Donald and Charles 
were currently police officers in the United States, they should act based 
upon the latter set of considerations.2  This is because the rules of third-
party consent law dictate when the government may justify a 
warrantless search with consent lawfully obtained from a third party 
                                                 
1 This example is fictional.  Any resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, or facts 
is purely coincidental. 
2 See infra Part II (discussing the current state of third-party consent law, the law that 
governs situations such as this, in the United States). 
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rather than from the person whose property the police plan on searching 
or seizing.3  The latter set of considerations confronting Officers Donald 
and Charles, created by a patchwork of Supreme Court cases, could 
prevent them from entering a residence in a situation where violence or 
the destruction of evidence was likely, but allow them to enter when the 
only potential result is disturbing a quiet home and quashing the male 
tenant’s right to privacy.4  This result is because of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Randolph v. Georgia, which has added yet another exception to 
the already exception-laden body of third-party consent law.5  Officers 
Donald and Charles, whose real-world counterparts grapple with the 
same concerns on a daily basis, illustrate the effect of the several fact-
sensitive third-party consent law rules.6  Lower court splits on issues of 
third-party consent law indicate that it similarly puzzles judges.7  Given 
the difficulties confronting police officers and the current split among the 
circuit courts in determining how and in what circumstances Randolph 
should be applied, it is clear that a more logical and straightforward 
approach is necessary.8 
This Note contemplates an approach to resolving the problems 
created by the Randolph holding.9  In doing so, Part II provides the 
backdrop necessary to understand third-party consent law, the Randolph 
holding, and the current circuit court split over Randolph.10  Part III then 
scrutinizes the interpretations of Randolph advocated by the various 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., David J. Sachar, Overview of Arkansas Search and Seizure Law, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 423, 450–51 (2001); Matt McCaughey, And a Child Shall Lead Them:  The Validity 
of Children’s Consent to Warrantless Searches of the Family Home, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 
747, 748–51 (1996); Gary L. Wimbish, Note, The U.S. Supreme Court Adopts “Apparent 
Authority” Test to Validate Unauthorized Third Party Consent to Warrantless Search of Private 
Premises in Illinois, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 301, 305–06 (1991) (all expounding this same general 
definition of third-party consent). 
4 See infra Part II.E (articulating the law espoused in Georgia v. Randolph, which 
established that a search is not constitutional as to physically present co-tenant who objects 
to the search, based on the consent of another co-tenant). 
5 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
6 See infra Part III (criticizing the current state of third-party consent law for its over-
complication and counter-intuitiveness, and the resulting difficulty for police officers to 
apply the law while working in the field). 
7 See infra Part III.A (discussing the Appellate split on interpreting the Randolph 
decision). 
8 See infra Parts II.F, III.A, and IV (discussing the current circuit split and the proposed 
reasonableness balancing test aimed at addressing said split). 
9 See infra Part IV (proposing a four-pronged reasonableness balancing test to replace 
the fractured third-party consent law rules). 
10 See infra Part II (reflecting on the history of the Fourth Amendment, the origins of 
consent law, and the landmark cases in the doctrine of third-party consent). 
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lower courts and evaluates those implications.11  Part IV articulates a 
model approach to determining the efficacy of consent that would best 
assist courts and law enforcement officers in the field.12  Finally, Part V 
returns to Officers Donald and Charles, and resolves their dilemma and 
this Note.13 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The first step in evaluating third-party consent law is to understand 
its Constitutional and common law origins.14  To that end, this section 
establishes the background for the current split among the Federal 
Courts of Appeals regarding the United States Supreme Court’s holding 
in Randolph.15  Part II.A briefly reviews struggles in interpreting the 
Fourth Amendment and how these struggles underlie all issues courts 
face involving the Fourth Amendment.16  Next, Part II.B discusses 
consent searches, specifically examining how the Court’s decisions 
regarding consent searches have evolved to their present state.17  Then 
Parts II.C and II.D narrow the topic to third-party consent searches, and 
examine those Supreme Court and lower court decisions prior to 
Randolph.18  Part II.E engages in a thorough discussion of Randolph, 
paying attention to the rationales of the majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions.19  Finally, Part II.F sets forth the justifications for the 
decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 
                                                 
11 See infra Part III (critiquing the lower court decisions and the social-expectations 
analysis advanced in Randolph, and considering the implications for important public 
policy issues). 
12 See infra Part IV (proposing a new balancing approach to determine the efficacy of 
consent, based on factors identified in the Randolph Court’s dicta). 
13 See infra Part V (offering summation and parting remarks about the future of third-
party consent). 
14 See infra Parts II.A–C (providing a history of the Fourth Amendment and landmark 
Supreme Court cases dealing with consent and third-party consent searches). 
15 See infra Parts II.A–F (establishing the law prior to the circuit split in Parts II.A–E, and 
explaining the split in Part II.F). 
16 See infra Part II.A (discussing the inherent tensions between the Warrant Clause and 
the Reasonableness Clause and the evolving standards for each advanced by the Supreme 
Court). 
17 See infra Part II.B (discussing the means for conducting a consent search, and the 
varying standards for determining consent). 
18 See infra Part II.C–D (primarily examining the precursors to Georgia v. Randolph, United 
States v. Matlock, and Illinois v. Rodriguez, setting forth their rules of law, and discussing 
how lower courts applied those rules). 
19 See infra Part II.E (discussing the facts and opinions set forth by the Court in Georgia v. 
Randolph). 
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Circuits that have created the split necessitating further clarification of 
the third-party consent standard set out by the Supreme Court.20 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
The third-party consent doctrine falls within the constitutional topic 
of searches; thus, the Fourth Amendment is the starting point for an 
understanding of third-party consent.21  The two clauses upon which the 
Amendment is predicated are the Reasonableness Clause22 and the 
Warrant Clause.23  These two clauses are viewed by scholars and the 
courts as both working in concrete and as being in conflict with one 
another.24  One of the central difficulties in interpreting the Fourth 
                                                 
20 See infra Part II.F (presenting the interpretations of Randolph reached by the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals). 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id. 
22 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 365 (1967) (“The [reasonableness] clause protects 
‘persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. . . .’  
These words connote the idea of tangible things with size, form, and weight, things capable 
of being searched, seized, or both.”).  See also Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons 
from the Highway and Subway:  A Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 
719, 732 (2007) (discussing how the concept of reasonableness interacts with the core 
Fourth Amendment concept of a right to privacy to protect individual rights). 
23 Katz, 389 U.S. at 365 (“The [warrant] clause of the Amendment . . . establishes its 
Framers’ purpose to limit its protection to tangible things by providing that no warrants 
shall issue but those ‘particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.’”).  See also Sharon L. Davies & Anna B. Scanlon, Katz in the Age of 
Hudson v. Michigan:  Some Thoughts on “Suppression as a Last Resort”, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1035, 1074 (2008) (discussing how, although the placement of the uninformative comma has 
created debate over the relationship between the two clauses, the Court has held that the 
warrant clause requires a warrant wherever it is practical to obtain one). 
24 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  See also United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 
(1972) (“Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of ‘unreasonable searches and 
seizures,’ the definition of ‘’reasonableness’ turns, at least in part, on the more specific 
commands of the warrant clause.”); Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches:  Searches and the 
Misunderstood Common-Law History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 
6–7 (2007) (discussing the tension between the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant 
Clause being apparent in the Court’s jurisprudence based upon trends where the Court 
uses the Reasonableness Clause to judge the constitutionality of civil searches and the 
Warrant Clause to judge the constitutionality of criminal searches); Thomas Y. Davies, 
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 558 (1999).  The Warrant 
Clause begins “and no Warrants” and protects against the granting of general warrants.  Id.  
General warrants were common during the framers’ era and allowed for searches in 
locations such as “suspected places.”  Id.  Conversely, the Reasonableness Clause is the 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 [2010], Art. 3
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Amendment has been how properly to construe these clauses together.25  
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment mirror the 
internal tensions between the two clauses, with the Court once preferring 
warrants that minimally required compliance with the warrant standard, 
but gradually relaxing its standard.26  More recently, the Court has 
moved from its warrant requirement and started to put an emphasis on 
reasonableness.27  This movement began with Katz v. United States, which 
established the current controlling test for determining whether an 
individual has a right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment.28  
Although police officers are still generally required to secure warrants 
before conducting searches, there are now many exceptions that obviate 
this requirement.29  As the Court gradually carved exceptions into the 
                                                                                                             
general proposition that the government will not violate an individual’s right to “be 
secure” by conducting “unreasonable searches.”  Id. at 557. 
25 Davies, supra note 24, at 551 (stating that one of the biggest points of contention with 
the Fourth Amendment is the difficulty in determining how the two clauses fit together 
because the Amendment does not indicate when arrests or searches can be discretionary, 
and when arrests must be made pursuant to probable cause and a warrant).  See also 
Russell M. Gold, Note, Is This Your Bedroom?:  Reconsidering Third-Party Consent Searches 
Under Modern Living Arrangements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 375, 378–79 (2008) (discussing the 
inherent infringements on privacy in allowing warrant-based searches); Samuel D. Warren 
& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, (1890) (discussing the 
important right to privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment). 
26 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 45455 (1971); Katz, 389 U.S. at 347; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 
(1951); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 706 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 
U.S. 20, 33 (1925) (all stating the same general principle that any warrantless arrest or 
search is per se unreasonable, subject to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions). 
27 See, e.g., Matthew J. Hodge, Note, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Issues on the 
“New” Internet:  Facebook.com and MySpace.com, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 95, 100 (2006) (discussing 
how the Katz Court dropped the literal reading of the Fourth Amendment from previous 
cases, and embraced a two-step approach to reasonableness); Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a 
Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 554 (1990) (discussing 
decisions subsequent to Katz, and how the decision is now used by the government to 
justify its behavior in accessing intimate details of individual’s lives); Jed Rubenfeld, The 
End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 108 (2008) (discussing the ineluctable circularity of 
gauging the reasonable expectations of privacy); Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations 
and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 848 (2002) (explaining the two-part test 
for reasonableness elucidated in Katz, and the operational outcomes of such a standard). 
28 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has 
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be 
one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”);  See also Stephanie M. Godfrey 
& Kay Levine, Much Ado About Randolph:  The Supreme Court Revisits Third Party Consent, 
42 TULSA L. REV. 731, 746–47 (2007) (discussing Katz’s two-pronged approach to help 
distinguish reasonable from unreasonable searches). 
29 See Justin H. Smith, Comment, Press One For Warrant:  Reinventing the Fourth 
Amendment’s Search Warrant Requirement Through Electronic Procedures, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
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requirements for a warrant, it replaced its warrant preference with the 
current discretionary standard that relies solely on reasonableness.30  In 
recent years, the Court has provided police officers with additional 
justifications to enter residences by creating several specific exceptions to 
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.31 
B. Consent Searches 
Consent searches are one such evolving exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.32  In Amos v. United States, one of 
the first decisions addressing consent, the Court held that a search of 
Amos’s home upon his wife’s “waiver” of a warrant was an 
unconstitutional search under the theory of implied coercion.33  Several 
years later, the Court departed from this theory in the landmark case of 
                                                                                                             
1591, 1593 (2002) (indicating that, although there is a warrant requirement, it has become 
the exception, rather than the rule, with at least twenty exceptions existing as of 1985); 
Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance:  Resurrecting the Warrant 
Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 536–37 (1997) 
(discussing the gradual erosion of the warrant requirement from what were once a few 
narrow exceptions to what is now only a standard of “general reasonableness”). 
30 See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1990); United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973) (stating that the 
appropriate determination is not made in light of a warrant, but whether the search itself 
was reasonable in light of the underlying facts and circumstances.); see also Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) 
(discussing exceptions to the warrant requirement). 
31 See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text (discussing the relaxing of the warrant 
standard and the effect of this relaxing); see also Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Better 
Categorical Balance of the Costs and Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 
208–18 (2005) (explaining some of the exceptions to the warrant requirement and the 
functional necessity of creating such exceptions to prevent guilty defendants from escaping 
conviction). 
32 Compare Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is equally well settled 
that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and 
probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.” (citing Davis v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 582, 593–94 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946))), with 
Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).  See also Ric Simmons, Not Voluntary But Still 
Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 
773 (2005) (citing police figures that estimate that some 90 to 98 percent of all searches were 
conducted under the consent exception to the warrant requirement). 
33 255 U.S. at 315–17.  In Amos, Federal officers arrived at the home of Amos and his wife 
to search the premises for violations of revenue laws.  Id. at 315.  The officers did not have 
warrants, but the wife granted access to the home and their adjacent store, during which 
the officers found illegal whisky that was being sold without proper taxation.  Id.  The 
Court rejected the government’s argument that Amos’s wife waived Amos’s Fourth 
Amendment rights, and did not arrive at the question of whether a third party could waive 
another party’s Fourth Amendment rights, instead resolving the issue of consent on the 
grounds that no such waiver could be intended or effected given the inherent implied 
coercion in any warrantless search.  Id. at 317. 
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Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.34  There, the Court first established the 
requirements necessary for a consent exception to the warrant 
requirement.35  In Schneckloth, the Court made clear that in determining 
whether an individual had consented to a search, the voluntariness of 
the consent was the only relevant determination.36  The Court found a 
compelling societal justification in that consent searches are often the 
only means of obtaining reliable and important evidence, and thus 
weighed the totality of the circumstances to determine voluntariness of 
consent.37  Although some commentators have suggested that the Court 
should abolish consent searches, the Court has instead continued to 
expand the consent exception, primarily by enlarging the classification of 
individuals who can grant consent, as evidenced by the third-party 
                                                 
34 412 U.S. at 218.  In Schneckloth, police officers pulled over a car in which defendant 
Bustamonte was a passenger.  Id. at 220.  Another passenger, Acala, informed police that 
his brother owned the car and consented to the police request to search the car.  Id.  Police 
officers discovered stolen checks during the search, which were used as evidence against 
Bustamonte and a basis upon which he was convicted.  Id..  Bustamonte’s motion to 
suppress the checks was denied at the trial court level.  Id.  The California Court of Appeal 
upheld the trial court’s ruling, finding that the voluntariness of consent was a question of 
fact.  Id. at 220–21.  The California Supreme Court denied review.  Id. at 221.  Thereafter, the 
respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court, which the court also 
denied.  Id.  After taking appeal, the Ninth Circuit set aside the district court order, ruling 
that consent was valid not only if it was not coerced, but also with the knowledge that it 
could “be freely and effectively withheld.”  Id. at 222.  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to determine whether the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments required the 
showing held by the Ninth Circuit.  Id. at 222.  See also George C. Thomas III, Terrorism, Race 
and a New Approach to Consent Searches, 73 MISS. L.J. 525, 545–46 (2003) (discussing the 
differences of the “pre-Schneckloth” standard, and the reluctance of Justice Stewart to 
release the opinion, and spark more debate over a new Fourth Amendment standard). 
35 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 249 (holding that the validity of an individual’s consent is a 
question of fact to be determined from all pertinent circumstances).  See also Thomas Y. 
Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez Demeans 
Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the Excusability of Police 
Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1, 26 (1991) (discussing how many early decisions used lax 
standards to find a waiver to search). 
36 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233–34 (discussing previous decisions in finding that 
knowledge of one’s right to refuse is not a prerequisite for voluntary consent, but rather, is 
one consideration the Court takes into account when determining voluntariness).  See also 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 54849 (1968); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 
1617 (1948); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593 (1946). 
37 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 247–48. 
It is also argued that the failure to require the Government to establish 
knowledge as a prerequisite to a valid consent, will relegate the Fourth 
Amendment to the special province of ‘the sophisticated, v. 
knowledgeable and the privileged.’ . . . The traditional definition of 
voluntariness we accept today has always taken into account evidence 
of minimal schooling, low intelligence, and the lack of any effective 
warnings to a person of his rights . . . . 
Id. 
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consent exception.38  Thus, consent searches have become a prominent 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and the 
category now has its own distinct subcategories.39 
C. Third-Party Consent Searches Prior to Georgia v. Randolph 
Within the body of consent law is third-party consent law, an area 
that the Court has refined primarily through the holdings of United States 
v. Matlock and Illinois v. Rodriguez.40  The Court expanded the doctrine to 
its current standard that a member of a shared household has the 
authority to consent to a search in that household, even if the evidence 
sought by the search does not concern the individual consenting to the 
search.41  Although the question of whether the police obtained 
voluntary consent is still a concern in third-party consent cases, the 
primary issue shifts to the circumstances under which the third party’s 
consent is valid.42 
Prior to the landmark decisions of Matlock and Rodriguez, courts 
decided several cases with little analysis, by refusing to grant a third 
party the ability to consent.43  Finally, in Stoner v. California, the Supreme 
                                                 
38 See Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 258–71 
(2001) (reasoning that the difficulty in distinguishing between coercive and voluntary 
consent is extremely difficult, especially when a power imbalance, such as that between 
police officers and individuals faced with consenting, is implicated); Harvard Law Review 
Association, Note, The Fourth Amendment and Antidilution: Confronting the Overlooked 
Function of the Consent Doctrine, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2187–88 (2006) (stating that the 
consent doctrine has found “few friends” because of the likelihood for racial profiling and 
law enforcement abuse that it offers). 
39 See supra notes 30–35 (reflecting upon the evolution of the consent exception to the 
warrant requirement, and the gradual loosening of its standard). 
40 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).  See also Elizabeth A. 
Wright, Third Party Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment:  Refusal, Consent, and 
Reasonableness, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1841, 1852–54 (2005) (calling Matlock and Rodriguez 
the “most important” and “leading” cases in developing the body of third-party consent 
law, respectively); Sharon E. Abrams, Comment, Third-Party Consent Searches, the Supreme 
Court, and the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 963, 969 (1984) (generally 
discussing the evolution of the Supreme Court third-party consent law, and its 
transformation through Matlock and Rodriguez). 
41 See Wright, supra note 40, at 1857–59 (describing the rationales for allowing third-
party consent searches under Matlock and Rodriguez, which allow consent to be granted by 
a co-tenant against whom the search is not being performed). 
42 See generally Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 107 (2006); Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177; 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (all focusing on the issue of whether the third party had the requisite 
authority to grant consent rather than the voluntariness of that consent). 
43 See People v. Dent, 19 N.E.2d 1020, 1021 (Ill. 1939); People v. Lind, 18 N.E.2d 189, 191 
(Ill. 1938); Hays v. State, 261 P. 232, 234 (Ok. Crim. Ct. App. 1927) (generally stating that, 
without specific authorization, an individual cannot waive another’s constitutional 
protection against unlawful searches). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 [2010], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss2/3
2010] Bad Application of a Bad Standard 431 
Court articulated a more thorough opinion discussing third-party 
consent, in which it adhered to the same narrow requirements for 
granting third-party consent as the lower courts.44  There, the Court held 
that police had no basis to believe that a hotel clerk had the authority to 
consent to the search; the clerk had no constitutional stake in the search, 
so he did not have the power to consent to it.45  Shortly after deciding 
Stoner, the Frazier v. Cupp Court developed the theory of “assumption of 
risk” as it pertains to third-party consent.46  In Frazier, the Court quickly 
disposed of the third-party consent issue by refusing to debate 
“metaphysical subtleties,” holding that Frazier had assumed the risk that 
his friend, Rawls, would allow someone to search his bag when Frazier 
gave him permission to use a compartment therein and left the bag at 
Rawls’s house.47 
                                                 
44 376 U.S. 483 (1964).  Acting on tips and positive identifications from robbery 
witnesses, police asked a hotel clerk if the defendant was at the hotel.  Id. at 484–85.  The 
clerk informed them that he was staying there, but was currently away.  Id. at 485.  The 
officers then explained why they needed to enter, and requested the key, to which the clerk 
obliged.  Id.  See also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616–17 (1961) (granting no 
rights to landlords to consent to searches of their tenants’ residences, as it would effectively 
nullify the Fourth Amendment rights of the tenants). 
45 Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489. 
[There is no] substance to the claim that the search was reasonable 
because the police, relying upon the night clerk’s expressions of 
consent, had a reasonable basis for the belief that the clerk had 
authority to consent to the search.  Our decisions make clear that the 
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded by 
strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of 
‘apparent authority.’ . . . [i]t was a right, therefore, which only the 
petitioner could waive by word or deed, either directly or through an 
agent. 
Id. 
46 394 U.S. 731 (1969).  In Frazier, police arrested Rawls, who consented to a search of a 
duffel bag jointly used by Frazier and Rawls, which was left in Rawls’s bedroom.  Id. at 740.  
The officers found evidence against Frazier in the bag and seized it.  Id.  Frazier argued that 
Rawls had permission to use only one compartment in the bag, and thus did not have 
authority to grant a search of the rest of the bag.  Id.  In its holding, the Court established 
that Frazier “assumed the risk,” a theory based on “mutual use of property by individuals 
generally having joint access or control for most purposes.”  United States v. Matlock, 415 
U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1974) (under this doctrine, “it is reasonable to recognize that any of the 
co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others 
have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be 
searched.”). 
47 Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740 (“We will not, however, engage in such metaphysical subtleties 
in judging the efficacy of Rawls’ consent.  Petitioner, in allowing Rawls to use the bag and 
in leaving it in his house, must be taken to have assumed the risk that Rawls would allow 
someone else to look inside.”). 
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The Court returned to Frazier’s unreached issue of third-party 
consent in Matlock.48  There, the question before the Court was whether 
the consent of a third party for police to search the living quarters of the 
defendant was legally sufficient to render evidence obtained during the 
search admissible at trial.49  The Court held that consent was sufficient 
because Gayle Graff (“Mrs. Graff”) granted her voluntary consent to a 
search in an area over which she had “common authority.”50  She had 
common authority over the premises, so she also had actual authority to 
grant the search of the room.51  The Court did not decide whether she 
had apparent authority to consent to the search.52  In so holding, the 
Court adopted two justifications for third-party consent:  common 
authority and assumption of risk.53  After a cursory review of its prior 
third-party consent decisions, the Court found that assumption of risk 
                                                 
48 See, e.g., Madeline E. McNeeley, Constitutional Law—Search and Seizure—Validity of 
Consent to Warrantless Search of Residence When Co-Occupant Expressly Rejects, 74 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 259, 265–67 (2007) (discussing how Frazier set the stage for the Court to decide Matlock 
and Rodriguez); Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 Wash. U. 
L.Q. 175, 181–82 (1991) (contemplating factual differences between Frazier and Matlock, and 
their outcome-determinative nature). 
49 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166.  Police arrested the defendant in the front yard of the house in 
which he lived with Mrs. Graff.  Id. at 165.  The defendant was placed in a police car a short 
distance from the house.  Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Without attempting to gain 
consent from the defendant, the police obtained consent to search the premises from Mrs. 
Graff.  Id. at 165.  Upon searching, officers found and confiscated money from a closet in a 
bedroom that Mrs. Graff indicated she shared with the defendant.  Id.  The defendant was 
indicted for bank robbery and moved to suppress the money since it was obtained without 
his consent.  Id.  The district court held that while the government had satisfactorily proven 
that it reasonably appeared to the officers that Mrs. Graff had the apparent authority to 
permit the search, but they had not proven that she had the actual authority to consent to 
the search, both of which were necessary for consent.  Id. at 167–68.  The court of appeals 
affirmed in all respects, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Id. at 166–69. 
50 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 (holding that that permission to search could be granted by a 
third party who “possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the 
premises or effects sought to be inspected.”). 
51 Id. at 177 n.14 (stating that the government did not reach its contention that the 
government need only show that the officers “reasonably believed that Mrs. Graff had 
sufficient authority over the premises to consent to the search”). 
52  Id. at 171 (because the government carried its burden of proving that Mrs. Graff’s 
voluntary consent to search was legally sufficient, the Court did not arrive at another of the 
United States’s contentions, that the government needed to prove only that the police 
reasonably believed that Mrs. Graff had authority to consent to a search). 
53 Id.  See also, e.g., Davies, supra note 35, at 18–19 (discussing Matlock’s definitions and 
usage of the terms “common authority” and “assumption of risk,” and how these 
standards influenced the subsequent Rodriguez decision); Rotenberg, supra note 48, at 181–
82 (scrutinizing the assumption of the risk justification of Matlock, and attempting to 
discern its precise meaning). 
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served as a rationale for the search.54  The Court thus derived the 
overarching principle of common authority—that joint use confers the 
power to permit inspection.55  One issue the Court failed to reach in 
Matlock was whether apparent authority of the consenting third party 
was sufficient for police to conduct a search.56  The Court addressed 
precisely this issue in another seminal third-party consent case, Illinois v. 
Rodriguez.57  There the Court further relaxed the standard for valid third-
party consent.58  The Court held that if police reasonably believe that an 
individual granting consent to search has the authority to consent, that 
consent is valid, even if the belief was incorrect.59  In support of its 
                                                 
54 See Rotenberg, supra note 48, at 181–82. (discussing the Court’s previous holdings 
relating to assumption of risk and intertwining assumption of the risk with the doctrine of 
common authority).  See also Shane E. Eden, Note, Picking the Matlock:  Georgia v. 
Randolph and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Re-Examination of Third-Party-Consent Authority in 
Light of Social Expectations, 52 S.D. L. REV. 171, 201–02 (2007) (tracking the evolution of the 
assumption of risk doctrine, and its presence in other, less highly regarded, Supreme Court 
cases). 
55 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 172 n.7. The case described “common authority” as the: 
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or 
control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any 
of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own 
right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their 
number might permit the common area to be searched. 
Id. 
56 Id. at 177 n.14. 
Accordingly, we do not reach another major contention of the United 
States in bringing this case here:  that the Government in any event 
had only to satisfy the District Court that the searching officers 
reasonably believed that Mrs. Graff had sufficient authority over the 
premises to consent to the search. 
Id. 
57 497 U.S. 177, 179 (1990).  In Rodriguez, officers gained entry to the defendant’s 
apartment with the consent of Gail Fischer, who claimed to have been beaten earlier in the 
day by the defendant.  Id. at 179.  She led police to an apartment that she claimed belonged 
to her and the defendant, referring to it as “our” apartment and stating that she had clothes 
and furniture there.  Id.  The police did not obtain a warrant to enter the apartment nor did 
they request the defendant’s consent.  Id. at 180.  Once inside, police arrested the defendant 
for possession of illegal drugs that the police seized after finding them in plain view.  Id.  
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, which the trial court granted on the 
grounds that Fischer did not have common authority over the apartment because she had 
moved out.  Id.  The trial court rejected the government’s argument that even if Fischer did 
not have common authority, there was no Fourth Amendment violation because the police 
reasonably believed she had authority to consent.  Id.  The appellate court affirmed, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Id. at 180–81. 
58 See Davies, supra note 35, at 26 (discussing how Rodriguez downgrades the Fourth 
Amendment by granting authority in “seeming consent” which would not be reasonable 
since it would not meet either a probable cause standard or a warrant standard). 
59 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188. 
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conclusion, the Court cited Brinegar v. United States for the proposition 
that most discretionary functions police perform utilize a reasonableness 
standard.60  From there, the Court attempted to reconcile its holding with 
the facts in Stoner to demonstrate that the holding did not grant police 
substantial latitude to conduct searches.61  In sum, the Matlock and 
Rodriguez courts departed substantially from the narrow standard 
announced in Stoner to one that allows a third party, who only “appears” 
to have authority over premises, to be able to consent to a search.62 
D. Lower Court Split Leading to Georgia v. Randolph 
Before Georgia v. Randolph, a large number of lower courts split on an 
issue unconsidered by Matlock and Rodriguez:  whether a search of 
shared premises is constitutionally valid when both co-tenants are 
physically present, but one tenant consents while the other does not.63  
The majority position cited the doctrines of common authority and 
assumption of risk to explain that the physical presence should make no 
difference in the outcome.64  This majority included the four Circuit 
                                                                                                             
Even when the invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion that 
the person lives there, the surrounding circumstances could 
conceivably be such that a reasonable person would doubt its truth 
and not act upon it without further inquiry. . . . [D]etermination of 
consent to enter must “be judged against an objective standard:  would 
the facts available to the officer at the moment . . .  warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief” that the consenting party had 
authority over the premises? 
Id.  (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968)). 
60 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186–88 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 
(1949) (“Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their 
duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part.  
But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their 
conclusions of probability.”)). 
61 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186–88 (demonstrating the present holding would reach a result 
consistent with Stoner by stating that it was illogical for the police in Stoner to rely upon the 
obtained consent because they knew it came from a hotel clerk who would not have 
general access to or control over rented room exclusively occupied by a guest). 
62 Compare Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489, with Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, and Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 
186–88. 
63 See Wright, supra note 40, at 1862 (discussing a circuit court split created, in part, by a 
lower court’s ruling in Randolph v. State, predecessor to Georgia v. Randolph); see also 
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 808–09 (2007) (contemplating third-
party consent law prior to Randolph, and how police had more latitude in a number of 
circumstances, to justify entry). 
64 See United States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 532 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hendrix, 
595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Seale v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1048, 1050 (Ind. 
App. 2006); State v. Rowlett, 859 A.2d 303, 312 (Md. App. 2004); Primus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 
370, 376 (Ind. App. 2004) (all holding that an individual’s ability to give consent does not 
depend on his or her physical location). 
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Courts of Appeals that considered the issue.65  The First Circuit case of 
United States v. Donlin illustrates the majority position.66  In Donlin, 
officers entered an apartment belonging to the Donlins when Mr. Donlin 
did not consent, but Mrs. Donlin did.67  While searching, the officers 
discovered several weapons in the apartment.68  The trial court denied 
Mr. Donlin’s attempt to suppress the weapons found during the search.69  
In upholding the decision, the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a 
third party with “common authority” over the premises may give valid 
consent and that this consent remains valid even if another co-occupant 
specifically objects to it.70  Conversely, the minority position contended 
that “common authority” was irrelevant when both parties are present, 
holding that a third party’s consent is invalid if another present co-tenant 
voices an objection.71  State v. Leach, a prominent minority case, set forth 
                                                 
65 See Morning, 64 F.3d at 533-536; United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1992); 
Hendrix, 595 F.2d at 885 ; United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687–88 (6th Cir. 1977). 
66 982 F.2d at 3334 (holding that consent by third party with common authority over 
premises that police intend to search remains valid even when defendant specifically 
objects to it, and even when there is delay, so long as that delay is reasonable). 
67 Id. at 32.  Following a violent argument between Mr. and Mrs. Donlin, police arrived 
on the scene to find Mrs. Donlin outside of the Donlins’ apartment.  Id.  After learning that 
Mr. Donlin was violent and intoxicated, police attempted to assist Mrs. Donlin in gaining 
entry to gather belongings to take elsewhere.  Id.  Mrs. Donlin unlocked the apartment 
door, which opened only a few inches because the security chain was fastened.  Id.  The 
Donlins conversed until Mr. Donlin discovered she was accompanied by police officers, at 
which point he spoke with them.  Id.  Police requested that Mr. Donlin allow them to enter 
to gather some of Mrs. Donlin’s belongings.  Id.  Upon learning that the officers did not 
have a warrant, Mr. Donlin denied the request, and shut and locked the door.  Id.  Prior to 
the door shutting, an officer lodged his flashlight in the opening; once the door shut, the 
flashlight fell inside the apartment.  Id.  Mrs. Donlin unlocked the door with her key a 
second time, allowing the officers to enter with the intentions to collect her belongings and 
arrest Mr. Donlin for theft of the flashlight.  Id.  Once inside, the officers found Mr. Donlin 
yelling and pointing a sawed-off shotgun at them, at which time they determined it would 
be wise to call for backup.  Id. 
68 Id.  When backup arrived approximately two hours later, the officers re-entered the 
apartment.  Id.  During their search, they found an illegal sawed-off shotgun disassembled 
on the ground, as well as other weapons, but not Mr. Donlin.  Id.  Upon further search, Mr. 
Donlin was found lying on the seat of his pickup truck in the parking lot.  Id. at 33. 
69 Id.  The trial court held that the use of Mrs. Donlin’s key justified the first two entries 
as valid consent searches and justified the third entry as valid because of exigent 
circumstances and probable cause.  Id.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that Mrs. Donlin’s 
unlocking of the door constituted implicit consent for the officers to search.  Id. 
70 Id. (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. 164; J.L. Foti Constr. Co. v. Donovan, 786 F.2d 714, 716–17 
(6th Cir. 1986); Donovan v. A.A. Beiro Constr. Co., 746 F.2d 894, 898–900 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
71 See Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16, 21 (9th Cir. 1965); State v. Brunetti, 883 A.2d 1167, 
1178 (Conn. 2005); Saavedra v. State, 622 So. 2d 952, 956 (Fla. 1993); State v. Leach, 782 P.2d 
1035, 1040 (Wash. 1989); Silvia v. State, 344 So. 2d 559, 562 (Fla. 1977); Tompkins v. Superior 
Court, 378 P.2d 113, 116 (Ca. 1963) (all holding that an express objection of a present co-
tenant restricts another co-tenant’s ability to consent.  These decisions put emphasis on the 
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the rationale for the minority position.72  In Leach, after a series of 
burglaries to neighboring businesses, Duncan Leach’s (“Leach”) 
girlfriend signed a consent-to-search form and unlocked Leach’s office, 
wherein the officers arrested him without requesting his consent.73  
Leach made a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the 
detective’s search of his office, but the court denied the motion and 
eventually convicted him.74  The Supreme Court of Washington held that 
“should the cohabitant be present and able to object, the police must also 
obtain the cohabitant’s consent.  Any other rule exhalts [sic] expediency 
over an individual’s Fourth Amendment guarantees.  Accordingly, we 
refuse to beat a path to the door of exceptions.”75  Rules in stark contrast 
with one another made the issue ripe for Supreme Court review.76 
                                                                                                             
importance of the distinction between being physically present and objecting, and not 
being physically present.  They assert that, given that in this scenario both co-tenants are 
essentially equal, any preferential treatment to the occupant granting consent is equivalent 
to nullifying the Fourth Amendment rights of the objecting co-tenant).  See also W. LAFAVE, 
2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.3 at 708 (1978); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth 
Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 63 (1974) (contending that one party’s right to consent in 
their own right does not outweigh an equal claim to privacy by a co-occupant on the 
scene). 
72 782 P.2d 1035 (Wash. 1989).  See also Kristy Duckwall, Ohio Supreme Court Decisions:  
2004, Cases Concerning Constitutional Law, State v. Leach, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 474, 479–82 
(2005) (commenting on the Leach decision and explaining how the Supreme Court had 
never addressed the issue, while the circuit courts were split on the issue). 
73 782 P.2d at 1036.  Shortly after Duncan Leach opened a travel company, a series of 
burglaries occurred in Leach’s office complex.  Id.  A little over one week later, Leach’s 
girlfriend, Cynthia Armstrong, met a detective to show him property that had been stolen 
from one of the businesses and Leach’s photo.  Id.  The next day, Leach’s girlfriend signed a 
consent-to-search form and escorted the detective to Leach’s business, which she unlocked 
with a key Leach had given to her.  Id.  After placing Leach under arrest and handcuffing 
him to a chair, the detective conducted a search, which turned up several items reported 
stolen by other businesses in the complex.  Id. at 1036–37. 
74 Id. at 1035–37.  The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether 
Leach’s girlfriend had authority over the business to consent to the search.  Id.  Upon a 
positive showing, the trial court convicted Leach of second-degree burglary and second-
degree attempted theft.  Id.  Leach appealed on the ground that the detective 
unconstitutionally seized evidence used to convict him.  Id. at 1035.  In holding that the 
analysis of whether consent is valid must focus on the relative privacy interests of the 
suspect objecting to consent and of the consenting party, the Washington Court of Appeals 
remanded to the trial court for additional findings.  Leach, 761 P.2d at 87.  The State then 
sought review.  Id. at 1035. 
75 Leach, 782 P.2d at 1040.  The court rejected the contention that common authority 
applies even when both co-occupants are present, reasoning that the Fourth Amendment 
rights of the non-consenting party are essentially ignored under that rationale, because in 
this circumstance both parties are on equal footing.  Id.  The court further stated that it did 
not look kindly on the police’s failure to get a warrant when it had ample opportunity to do 
so, and when there is the risk of evidence being suppressed due to claims of an illegal 
search and seizure.  Id. 
76 See Duckwall, supra note 72, at 481 (discussing the circuit court split). 
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With individual rights gradually eroding under the Supreme Court’s 
third-party consent cases, and a majority of lower courts extending the 
general rules of Matlock and Rodriguez, the outcome of any subsequent 
third-party consent cases appeared certain to continue the trend.  A 
growing number of split decisions from the lower courts on whether 
search of a residence’s common areas is reasonable when both co-
occupants are physically present, and one gives consent while the other 
refuses to consent, made the Court’s resolution of the question all but 
inevitable.77 
E. Georgia v. Randolph 
The inevitable occurred when the Court granted certiorari in Georgia 
v. Randolph to address the above issue and resolve the circuit split.78  The 
dispute in the case arose after Randolph’s (“Randolph”) wife, (“Mrs. 
Randolph”), informed police that her husband took their young son from 
their home.79  When police arrived at the couple’s house, Mrs. Randolph 
informed them that her husband used and possessed drugs in the 
home.80  With an unequivocal “no,” Randolph denied an officer’s request 
for consent to search the home, at which time the officer turned to Mrs. 
Randolph and asked for consent, which she provided.81  In an upstairs 
bedroom, an officer seized a section of drinking straw with a white 
                                                 
77 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006). 
78 Id. at 108.  (specifically stating the issue as “whether one occupant may give law 
enforcement effective consent to search shared premises, as against a co-tenant who is 
present and states a refusal to permit the search.”).  See also Meagan Rasch-Chabot, 
Comment, The Home as Their Castle:  An Analysis of Georgia v. Randolph’s Implications for 
Domestic Disputes, 30 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 507, 515 (2007) (setting forth the procedural 
posture of Randolph). 
79 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106.  Randolph and Mrs. Randolph separated in May 2001, at 
which time Mrs. Randolph left their residence in Georgia and took their son with her to 
Canada.  Id.  Mrs. Randolph and the couple’s son returned in July 2001 to the couple’s 
residence for reasons unknown.  Id. 
80 Id. at 107.  Mrs. Randolph contended that ’Randolph’s use of cocaine caused the 
couple financial problems.  Id.  She also informed the police of the couple’s separation and 
that their son had been staying with her parents for several weeks.  Id.  Randolph arrived 
back at the house shortly thereafter, explaining that he removed their child to a friend’s 
house because he feared that his wife would take him out of the country again.  Id.  
Randolph claimed that he did not use cocaine, but that his wife abused alcohol and drugs.  
Id.  One officer accompanied Mrs. Randolph to the friend’s house to recover the child.  Id.  
When she and the officer returned to the Randolphs’ house, she stated that there was 
evidence of drug use in the house.  Id. 
81 State v. Randolph, 590 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Ga. App. 2004).  Upon granting consent, Mrs. 
Randolph led officers to an upstairs bedroom of the house, which she claimed to be 
’Randolph’s room.  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107. 
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powdery substance that he suspected to be cocaine.82  The court used the 
confiscated evidence to indict Randolph for possession of cocaine, which 
he moved to suppress on the basis that the police obtained the evidence 
through a warrantless and unauthorized search of his home.83  The trial 
court denied the motion.84  On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia 
reversed, and the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals 
ruling.85 
In Randolph, the Court engaged in an early discussion of the limited 
exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 
discussing the rules elucidated from prior third-party consent cases.86  
Finding that no previous decisions specifically fit the facts in the present 
case, the Court turned to the underlying rationales for the decisions.87  
Considering those rationales, the Court determined that previous cases 
had given great significance to the underlying social expectations of each 
situation.88  The Court then engaged in an analysis of Minnesota v. Olson, 
                                                 
82 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107.  After leaving the house to get an evidence bag, the officer 
called the district attorney’s office, which advised him to stop the search and secure a 
warrant.  Id.  Once the officer returned to the house, Mrs. Randolph revoked her consent 
for the search.  Id.  The officers took the evidence, along with the Randolphs, back to the 
police station while they awaited a warrant.  Id.  Upon receiving a warrant, the police re-
entered the premises, and found more evidence of drug use.  Id. 
83 Id.  Randolph contended that his wife’s consent did not trump his denial of consent, 
and thus the search was unauthorized.  Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 108.  The Court of Appeals reversed on the reasoning that “ordinarily, persons 
with equal rights in a place would accommodate each other by not admitting persons over 
‘another’s objection while he was present’” (citing State v. Leach, 782 P.2d 1035, 1038 (1989) 
and noting that only underlying troubled circumstances would lead to one co-tenant 
granting consent while the other denied consent.  State v. Randolph, 590 S.E.2d 834, 836–37 
(Ga. App. 2004).  The Georgia Supreme Court reasoned that the consent of one co-occupant 
could not trump the denial of another present co-occupant because “‘a present, objecting 
party should not have his constitutional rights ignored  . . .  [due to a] property interest 
shared with another.’” (quoting Silva v. State, 344 So.2d 559, 562 (Fla.1977)). 
86 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109 (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)).  The 
Court then gave a cursory recitation of the rules elicited from prominent consent and third-
party consent cases, noting that none dealt with both co-occupants being present at the 
time of the search.  Id. at 109.  See also Gold, supra note 25, 378–79 (discussing the inherent 
infringements on privacy in allowing warrant-based searches); Adrienne Wineholt, Note, 
Georgia v. Randolph:  Checking Potential Defendants’ Fourth Amendment Rights at the Door, 66 
MD. L. REV. 475, 478–81 (2007) (discussing the exceptions to the warrant requirement 
arising from Katz and its progeny). 
87 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111.  See also Noah Stacy, Note, Apparent Third Party Authority and 
Computers:  Ignorance of the Lock is no Excuse, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1431, 1438 (2008) (explaining 
that the Court turned to the “constant element” in its prior third-party consent decisions to 
find a commonality among the decisions). 
88 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111.  The Court continued by analyzing the rationale in terms of 
Matlock, stating that the rules derived there were applications of social expectations in 
those circumstances, but that Matlock was not on point because two present co-occupants 
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a case in which it had recently held that overnight house guests had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy.89  The Court reasoned that if overnight 
house guests enjoyed this level of privacy, it naturally followed that a co-
occupant with a property interest in the residence has an even greater 
expectation of privacy.90 
Relying on the social expectations of each party in the situation, the 
Court stated that no caller standing at the door would enter if one tenant 
were inviting him or her inside, while the other tenant was telling him or 
her to stay out.91  Qualifying its statement, the Court indicated that a 
good reason, such as fear for the co-occupant offering consent or 
someone else inside, could provide justification for entry, even in the 
                                                                                                             
would not have the expectation of one being able to override the other’s express denial of 
consent if neither had superior rights over the other.  Id. at 111–114. 
89 Id. at 111.  In Olson, police suspected Olson of driving a getaway car used in a robbery 
and murder.  495 U.S. 91, 93 (1990).  The police discovered Olson was staying with two 
women, whose house they surrounded.  Id. at 94.  Police telephoned the house to request 
that Olson come out and, without seeking permission, entered the house and arrested 
Olson.  Id.  After weighing twelve factors to determine a houseguest’s expectation of 
privacy, the Court held that the social expectations of a house guest are that he will find 
shelter and privacy in another’s home, and thus the search was unconstitutional.  Id. at 99–
100.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that a house guest should have just as 
much privacy as a temporary guest in a phone booth, which is “a temporarily private place 
whose momentary ‘occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as 
reasonable”  Id. at 99 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
90 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113 (“If that customary expectation of courtesy or deference is a 
foundation of Fourth Amendment rights of a houseguest, it presumably should follow that 
an inhabitant of shared premises may claim at least as much, and it turns out that the co-
inhabitant naturally has an even stronger claim.”).  See also John M. Burkoff, Search Me?, 39 
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1109, 1132–36 (2007) (discussing thoroughly the Court’s reliance on 
“widely shared social expectations” in reaching its decision in Randolph and the 
implications thereof). 
91 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113 (stating that the caller’s reluctance would be based upon a 
common understanding that the disputes of co-tenants must be voluntarily resolved by one 
another, and not by an outside authority).  The Court further stated that unless there is a 
recognized hierarchy, such as parents and children, there is no inferior and superior co-
tenant, which is reflected by domestic property law, that “‘[e]ach cotenant  . . .  has the right 
to use and enjoy the entire property as if he or she were the sole owner, limited only by the 
same right in the other cotenants.’” (quoting R. Powell, 7 Powell on Real Property, § 50.03[1] 
(M. Wolf gen. ed. 2005)).  Id. at 114.  See also George M. Dery III & Michael J. Hernandez, 
Blissful Ignorance?  The Supreme Court’s Signal to Police in Georgia v. Randolph to Avoid 
Seeking Consent to Search from all Occupants of a Home, 40 CONN. L. REV. 53, 72–73 (2007) 
(discussing the societal norms and legal rules considered by the Court in arriving at the 
social-expectations test); Renee E. Williams, Note, Third Party Consent Searches After Georgia 
v. Randolph:  Dueling Approaches to the Dueling Roommates, 87 B.U. L. REV. 937, 948–49 
(2007) (analyzing the Court’s hypothetical situation presented to illustrate the social-
expectations test). 
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face of a disputed invitation.92  The Court then balanced the competing 
individual and governmental interests in searching, finding that one 
occupant’s consent does not tip the scales against the occupant denying 
consent.93  The majority added that the state’s countervailing interests in 
Randolph did not add enough to outweigh the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment interests.94 
Following this logic, the five-justice majority affirmed the Georgia 
Supreme Court’s decision, holding that “a warrantless search of a shared 
dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically 
present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis 
of consent given to the police by another resident.”95  Upon reaching this 
conclusion, the majority carefully articulated that it was not overruling 
Matlock or Rodriguez, noting that its present decision applied only to a 
physically present objecting co-tenant, not a nearby co-tenant or a 
physically present non-objecting co-tenant.96 
Despite joining the majority in part, Justice Stevens also penned a 
concurring opinion considering how changes in society have 
                                                 
92 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)).  See also 
Tuerkheimer, supra note 63, at 808–09 (discussing other justifications police may use in 
order to enter a residence, regardless of third-party consent). 
93 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113.  The Court stated “[u]nfortunately, there can be no ready 
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the 
invasion which the search entails.”  Camara v. Mun. Court of City & County of San 
Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967). 
94 547 U.S. at 115.  The Randolph Court rejected the state’s contention that police 
expediency was a countervailing interest justifying the search.  Id. at 115 n.5.  See also John 
D. Castiglione, Hudson and Samson:  The Roberts Court Confronts Privacy, Dignity, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 68 LA. L. REV. 63, 111–12 (2007) (contemplating the balance among 
“individual privacy, autonomy, and dignity with the concrete interest of government in 
law enforcement” that necessitated the majority’s holding in Randolph). 
95 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120.  In holding so, the majority rejected the dissent’s contention 
that such a holding shields domestic abusers because their denial of consent can prevent 
police from entering premises to protect a victim.  Id. at 117.  The majority states that so 
long as the police have reason to believe that such a threat exists, there is no doubt that 
they can lawfully enter over an objection, and while inside arrest a suspect and seize any 
evidence lawfully.  Id. at 118.  See also Abraham Tabaie, Protecting Privacy Expectations and 
Personal Documents in SEC Investigations, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 818 (2008) (commenting on 
the Court’s holding, but also considering the wider implications of the holding based upon 
the “strong language” as to the reasonable expectation of privacy an individual has in their 
own home). 
96 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121.  The Court justifies its assertion that the above individual 
“loses out” by arguing that the rule is valuable because there are two simple companion 
rules, one that recognizes the co-’tenant’s consent when no other occupants are present, 
and this rule, which grants weight to a co-’occupant’s denial of consent.  Id. at 121–22.  So 
long as the police do not remove a potentially objecting co-tenant for the purpose of 
circumventing his denial of consent, this simple rule is a fair counterpart to those found in 
Matlock and Rodriguez.  Id.  
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necessitated a new approach for determining the constitutionality of a 
search.97  Similarly, Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion, 
focused more on the problem of bright-line rules in Fourth Amendment 
cases.98  In his opinion, Justice Breyer instead advocated an approach 
that considers the totality of the circumstances, citing the ease of 
measuring “[r]easonableness” by such an approach.99  Asserting that in 
the instant case, the totality of the circumstances did not justify accepting 
one co-tenant’s consent over another’s refusal of consent, Justice Breyer 
remarked that if the circumstances should change significantly, he felt 
the result should as well.100  Justice Breyer felt that special circumstances, 
such as domestic violence, would create an immediate reason for entry, 
even if one co-tenant denied consent.101  He joined the Court’s holding 
and opinion because of the factually specific holding and because the 
search in the present case would not have been justified under his 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach.102 
In the first of three dissenting opinions, Chief Justice Roberts opened 
with a critical attack on the majority for its grant of protection on a 
                                                 
97 Id. at 123–24 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that a historical inquiry is not dispositive 
here because there have been hierarchical changes between man and woman, and now, 
unlike in the eighteenth century when the Fourth Amendment was written, a female co-
occupant should have rights equal to those of her male counterpart). 
98 Id. at 125 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not insist upon 
bright-line rules.  Rather, it recognizes that no single set of legal rules can capture the ever-
changing complexity of human life.  It consequently uses the general terms “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”). 
99 Id. (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 
136 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429, 439 (1991); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572–73 (1988); Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983) (plurality opinion)).  
100 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 125–26 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that the circumstances 
here are a search solely for evidence; a clear and direct objecting party was physically 
present and the officers did not justify their search on grounds of possible evidence 
destruction). 
101 Id.  Citing the frequency of domestic violence complaints in the circumstances that are 
mostly likely to give rise to this issue, Justice Breyer said that law enforcement officials 
must be able to respond effectively when confronted with domestic violence.  Id. at 126–27.  
This must be permissible to protect the victim and to obtain evidence that might not be 
available if the police must secure a warrant.  Id. at 127.  See also Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a 
Woman?, 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 503–04 (2009) (discussing Justice Breyer’s concerns about how the 
Randolph decision would impact certain situations in which police suspect domestic 
violence, but both co-tenants assure them that there are no issues). 
102 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 125–27.  Justice Breyer disagreed with the dissent’s contention 
that the majority’s holding would protect criminal activity such as domestic abuse because 
of the narrow, fact-specific nature of the holding.  Id. at 127. 
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“random and happenstance basis.”103  Arguing that the precedent 
established in Matlock was correct, he contended that the physical 
presence of the objecting co-tenant did not change the fact that the co-
tenant already assumed the risk that the items or information would be 
shared with the government.104  Chief Justice Roberts further asserted 
that even if there were uniform social expectations for the scenario, 
deciding the case on the social expectations of the parties was incorrect 
because third-party consent was not an issue of privacy.105  He 
contended that the only way to maintain privacy, and thus not assume 
the risk of another co-tenant consenting to a search of one co-tenant’s 
belongings, would be to place the items in an area over which others do 
not share control or access.106 
The Chief Justice arrived at another principal issue of the third-party 
consent doctrine in his dissent:  the effect on potential domestic violence 
victims.107  He reasoned that because the abuser who prompted the 
police’s arrival could prevent them from entering to protect the victim, 
the rule harms victims of domestic violence.108  The Chief Justice 
                                                 
103 Id. at 136–37 (citing as an example that while a co-tenant near the door when the 
officers request consent could deny consent, a co-tenant who is asleep on a couch in the 
next room, could not). 
104 Id. at 128 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  “The Chief Justice stated, 
[J]ust as an individual who has shared illegal plans or incriminating 
documents with another cannot interpose an objection when that other 
person turns the information over to the government, just because the 
individual happens to be present at the time, so too someone who 
shares a place with another cannot interpose an objection when that 
person decides to grant access to the police, simply because the 
objecting individual happens to be present.”.   
Id.  The Chief Justice countered the majority’s assertion that social expectations prevent an 
individual at the door from entering the premises upon the invitation of one co-tenant 
despite the other ’co-tenant’s objection, with scenarios in which the social expectation 
would be for the guest to enter.  Id. 
105 Id. at 130 (contending that the cases on which the majority relies for its analysis of 
widely shared social expectations are cases involving a legitimate expectation of privacy, 
and because the issue that gave rise to the present case is one of shared information, space, 
and materials, privacy cannot possibly be implicated). 
106 Id. at 135.  See Laura Krugman Ray, The Style of a Skeptic:  The Opinions of Chief Justice 
Roberts, 83 IND. L.J. 997, 1021 (2008) (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’s penchant for 
considering the practical, rather than the abstract, application of the rules of law the Court 
proposes; in Randolph, this resulted in his discussing the social expectations as a “common 
stalemate of two gentlemen insisting that the other enter a room first”). 
107 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 137–39 (arguing that the majority’s frequent use of the phrase “as 
to him” is illogical because it implies that the search would be constitutional as to someone 
else). 
108 Id. at 140–41.  The Chief Justice acknowledged the majority’s contention that the police 
would likely be able to enter under these circumstances, calling it a “consent plus a good 
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condemned the decision because he felt the majority’s decision 
minimally protected victims and because the decision failed to meet its 
aim of adding to privacy rights.109  Finally, he concluded by condemning 
the decision for its complete lack of guidance to police or lower courts.110  
The final two dissenting opinions did not significantly alter the 
substantive discussion of third-party consent law.111  However, one 
might also say that even those opinions formulating new rules for third-
party consent law did not add anything substantive to the body of law, 
given the subsequent holdings of lower courts.112 
F. Third-Party Consent Post-Georgia v. Randolph 
Immediately after the Court handed down its decision in Randolph, 
lower courts began applying the law inconsistently, relying on widely 
different interpretations of Randolph and declining to follow or 
distinguishing the case.113  The most prominent of these decisions 
interpreting Randolph have come from the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuit Courts, where the courts’ holdings have varied dramatically, 
creating a circuit split over the breadth of the Randolph holding.114  While 
some courts have applied principles gleaned from Randolph to the facts 
                                                                                                             
reason” rule, which he ultimately dismissed as an unnecessary modification to “a great 
deal of established Fourth Amendment law.”  Id. at 141. 
109 Id. at 141–42. 
110 Id. at 142. 
111 Id. at 143–45 (Justice Scalia’s opinion, in which he defended originalism, seemed to be 
written in regard to a personal riff with Justice Stevens, who attacked originalism in his 
concurring opinion.  Justice Thomas stated in his dissent that he would have decided the 
case on the precedent of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, where the Court held that no Fourth 
Amendment search occurs where the spouse of the accused voluntarily gives the police 
evidence of their spouse’s wrongdoing in an effort to clear him of suspicion, and thus 
would never have arrived at the issue of third-party consent). 
112 See infra Part III.B (discussing the flaws in the Randolph holding). 
113 See United States v. Reed, 539 F.3d 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hicks, 539 
F.3d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 2008) (a sampling of the many cases offering inconsistent 
interpretations of Randolph or distinguishing or declining to extend its rule); Moore v. 
Andreno, 505 F.3d 203, 210–13 (2nd Cir. 2007); United States v. Cos, 498 F.3d 1115, 1124 
(10th Cir. 2007); State v. Hurt, 743 N.W.2d 102, 108 (N.D. 2007); Commonwealth v. Ocasio, 
882 N.E.2d 341, 344 (Mass. App. 2008); State v. Por Hue Vue, 753 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Minn. 
App. 2008); see also Jason E. Zakai, Note, You Say Yes, But Can I Say No?, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 
421, 444 (2007). (discussing the Court’s holding and the likelihood of lower courts reaching 
differing conclusions in interpreting the holding). 
114 Compare United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2008), with United States v. 
Henderson, 536 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008), and United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954 (8th 
Cir. 2008). 
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of their cases, others have contended that the holding in Randolph is fact-
sensitive, and applies only to cases with a nearly-exact set of facts.115 
In United States v. Murphy, the Ninth Circuit became the first circuit 
to interpret Randolph.116  There, officers had followed Cozo and Wyman, 
individuals suspected of operating a methamphetamine lab, to a storage 
facility after having observed them purchasing ingredients used to 
manufacture methamphetamines.117  Murphy responded to the officers’ 
knocks at the door, and Officer Thompson recognized Murphy as a 
known methamphetamine manufacturer.118  Murphy refused to consent 
to a search of the premises, so Officer Thompson performed a protective 
sweep of the units and left the scene to secure a warrant.119  When Roper, 
the landlord of the units, arrived on the scene later that afternoon, he 
provided written consent for the police to search the units.120  Upon 
searching, police seized evidence of methamphetamine production, 
which they later used as evidence at Murphy’s trial.121  Murphy 
attempted to suppress the evidence, challenging the protective sweep 
and Roper’s consent to search.122  The Ninth Circuit Court heard the case 
on appeal, considering the motion in light of the then-newly-decided 
Randolph case.123 
The Ninth Circuit quickly disposed of the issue whether the 
protective sweep violated Murphy’s Fourth Amendment rights, citing 
                                                 
115 See Tracy Maclin, The Good and the Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme 
Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 74–75 (2008); David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary 
Rule, Among Other Things:  The Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2006 CATO SUP. 
CT. REV. 283, 292–93 (2006) (both discussing how Randolph’s protection will be extended 
only to those in factual circumstances where an individual is physically present at the time 
of the search, and raises an objection at that time). 
116 Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117. 
117 Id. at 1119.  The officers also knew that Murphy was in the storage units.  Id.  When 
Wyman left, they apprehended him and he informed them that Cozo was still inside the 
facility.  Id.  After Cozo left, police also apprehended him.  Id.  The officers then knocked on 
the door, and Murphy answered, holding a piece of metal pipe.  Id. 
118 Id.  Initially, the officer had difficulty in getting Murphy to drop the pipe, but 
eventually he complied.  Id. 
119 Id. at 1119–20.  From his position at the doorway, Officer Thompson observed a 
methamphetamine-manufacturing device operating in plain view inside the storage 
facility, and therefore arrested Murphy.  Id. at 1119. 
120 Id. at 1120.  When Roper arrived, police arrested him on unrelated outstanding 
warrants.  Id.  Roper claimed he had given Murphy permission to reside in the facility, but 
had no knowledge of the methamphetamine production therein.  Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id.  Initially, the district court denied Murphy’s motion to suppress and entered a 
conditional plea of guilty while reserving the right to appeal his plea.  Id.  In light of the 
Supreme Court’s March 2006 holding in Georgia v. Randolph, Murphy filed a motion to 
reconsider, which the district court also denied.  Id. 
123 Id. 
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United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez for the protective sweep exception to 
the warrant clause.124  On the issue of the search to which Roper 
consented, the court held that Randolph controlled and that “when a co-
tenant objects to a search and another party with common authority 
subsequently gives consent to that search in the absence of the first co-
tenant the search is invalid as to the objecting co-tenant.”125  The court 
reasoned that the rule from Randolph preventing the police from 
removing a co-tenant to avoid his potential objection logically extended 
to prevent the police from arresting a subject, and subsequently ignoring 
an objection that he had already made.126 
Only weeks later, the Eighth Circuit Court announced its decision in 
United States v. Hudspeth, a case almost factually analogous to Murphy.127  
There, the police discovered child pornography on Hudspeth’s business 
computer during a legal search, and arrested him for possession of child 
pornography.128  Before taking him to jail, police requested Hudspeth’s 
                                                 
124 United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1298 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that 
so long as protective sweeps are supported by “‘specific and articulable facts supporting 
[the] belief that other dangerous persons may be in the building or elsewhere on the 
premises’” they are valid) (quoting United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1014 (9th Cir. 
1983)).  The court found the protective sweep to be valid because Officer Thompson knew 
Roper, who had outstanding warrants, was not accounted for at the time; because 
Thompson limited his protective sweep to the immediate area of storage unit, the state met 
its burden of demonstrating that the sweep was valid.  Murphy, 516 F.3d at 1120–21.  See 
also Audrey Benison, Matthew J. Gardner, Amy S. Manning, Warrantless Searches and 
Seizures, 87 Geo. L.J. 1124, 1164–65 n.249 (1999) (explaining the Delgadillo-Velasquez 
holding). 
125 Murphy, 516 F.3d at 1124.  The court rejected the state’s contention that the search was 
justified because the officer saw the methamphetamine in plain view; there is no plain-view 
exception to the warrant requirement except in exigent circumstances.  Id.  The court stated 
that Roper was “in between a landlord, who may not consent to a search, and a co-tenant, 
who may” (citation omitted) and was considered to have the same rights as a co-tenant for 
the purposes of the opinion.  Id. at 1121 n.2.  The  court further held that Murphy had 
sufficient control over the storage unit to deny consent to search despite not having paid 
for the unit because Roper visited him in the unit without asking him, indicating Roper 
tacitly consented to Murphy’s use of the unit.  Id. at 1122–23. 
126 Id. at 1124–25.  The court held that because of this, there was no significance in 
Murphy’s not being present when Roper consented to the search, which was the case in 
Randolph.  Id. at 1124.  The court further stated that it saw no reason to limit Randolph’s 
holding to circumstances in which police remove the objecting co-tenant.  Id. at 1125.  
“Once a co-tenant has registered his objection, his refusal to grant consent remains effective 
barring some objective manifestation that he has changed his position and no longer 
objects.”  Id. 
127 Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008). 
128 Id. at 955.  Drug enforcement officials had arrived at Hudspeth’s business, Handi-Rak 
Services, Inc., with a search warrant, to find evidence relating to large-quantity sales of 
pseudoephedrine tablets.  Id.  Hudspeth agreed to talk with Missouri State Trooper 
Corporal Nash during the search.  Id.  The child pornography discovered on the office 
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consent to search his home computer, which he refused.129  When the 
officers arrived at Hudspeth’s home, they requested Mrs. Hudspeth’s 
permission to search the home, without indicating that her husband had 
previously denied consent.130  After a short discussion and after having 
failed to reach her lawyer, she acquiesced in the search.131  The officers 
found more child pornography on Hudspeth’s home computer.132 
The grand jury in the district court indicted Hudspeth for possession 
of child pornography, and after the court denied his motion to suppress 
the child pornography, the court sentenced Hudspeth to sixty months’ 
imprisonment, which he appealed.133  On appeal, the court held that one 
co-tenant could permit the search of shared premises despite a non-
contemporaneous objection of a non-physically present co-tenant.134  The 
Hudspeth court reasoned that the deliberately “fine line” drawn by the 
Randolph court factually distinguished the present case from Randolph 
and made applicable a totality-of-the-circumstances test derived from 
                                                                                                             
computer, along with information volunteered by Hudspeth, led Corporal Nash to believe 
that Hudspeth’s home computer may contain child pornography as well.  Id. 
129 Id.  The officers transported Hudspeth to jail, and then went to his house, where his 
wife and children met them.  Id. 
130 Id. at 956.  Mrs. Hudspeth initially refused the search, and Corporal Nash asked if he 
could take the home computer (which was located in the garage).  Id. at 955–56.  Mrs. 
Hudspeth indicated she did not know whether she should agree and asked Corporal Nash 
what the ramifications would be if she declined.  Id. at 956.  He explained that, until the 
police secured a search warrant, an armed, uniformed officer would be left at the house to 
ensure that they did not destroy any evidence.  Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. (including CDs bearing the same markings as those found at his office, images on 
the hard drive that had been downloaded from websites and online newsgroups, and 
video of his stepdaughter semi-nude and nude that he had secretly recorded of her with a 
web camera). 
133 Id.  After the suppression was denied, Hudspeth entered a conditional plea of guilty 
to possession of child pornography, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress.  Id.  During appeal but prior to the appellate court filing its opinion, the Supreme 
Court decided Randolph.  Id.  The appellate court requested further briefing on the impact 
of Randolph on its decision, and thereafter unanimously affirmed the denial of suppression 
and Hudspeth’s sentence, dividing over the application of Randolph.  Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 
932–33.  The majority held that under Randolph, Mrs. Hudspeth’s consent did not overrule 
’Hudspeth’s non-contemporaneous denial of consent.  Id. at 932.  The Eighth Circuit Court 
granted a rehearing on the issue of whether the warrantless seizure of Hudspeth’s home 
computer was valid under Randolph.  Hudspeth, 518 F.3d at 956. 
134 Hudspeth, 518 F.3d at 956.  Because it considered none of the cases completely on-
point, the court decided the case based on Matlock and Rodriguez in addition to Randolph.  
Id. at 959.  The court considered the fact that officers in Hudspeth were not confronted with 
a “social custom” issue, because both co-tenants were not voicing competing interests at 
the same time, to be an important distinction from Randolph.  Id. at 960. 
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prior third-party consent law.135  Under the totality-of-the-circumstances 
test, the search passed as reasonable.136 
In the similarly reasoned case of United States v. Henderson, the 
Seventh Circuit handed down its decision only a few months later, in 
August 2008.137  There, officers responded to a domestic violence 
complaint to find Patricia Henderson (“Mrs. Henderson”) standing in 
her yard.138  Police entered the Henderson residence, and after a brief 
verbal exchange with Kevin Henderson (“Henderson”), Henderson told 
them to leave.139  Instead, the officers arrested Henderson for domestic 
battery.140  After police took Henderson to the station, Mrs. Henderson 
signed a consent form, agreeing to a search of the home.141  During the 
search, officers discovered firearms, crack cocaine, and other items 
indicative of drug dealing.142 
At his trial, Henderson moved to suppress the seized evidence, 
arguing that Randolph required such suppression because he was a 
present and objecting resident whose express refusal to allow a search 
overrode Mrs. Henderson’s later consent.143  Upon granting review, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that once police had validly 
arrested a co-tenant and removed him from the home, his denial of 
                                                 
135 Id. 
136 Id. (in weighing the factors, the court considered that Corporal Nash had voluntarily 
informed Mrs. Murphy of her options, and because Mr. Murphy was not present at the 
time of his objection). 
137 536 F.3d 776. 
138 Id. at 777.  Mrs. Henderson told officers that after choking her, Henderson threw her 
out of the house when he learned that she had called 911.  Id.  Officers believed her story, as 
she had visible red marks around her neck.  Id.  The Hendersons’ teenage child arrived 
soon after the police and provided them with a key to enter the house.  Id.  Prior to 
entering, Mrs. Henderson informed the police that Henderson had weapons inside and had 
a long history of drug and weapons-related arrests.  Id. 
139 Id.  Upon entering, the police found Henderson sitting in the living room, at which 
time he told them, specifically, to “[g]et the [expletive] out of my house[,]” which the court 
interpreted as an objection to the search.  Id. at 777–78.  Mrs. Henderson did not hear or 
observe the encounter.  Id. at 778. 
140 Id. 
141 Id.  During the course of the search, at which Mrs. Henderson was present, she signed 
an additional consent form for the officers to search the Hendersons’ vehicle, where they 
discovered additional crack cocaine.  Id. 
142 Id. (finding the following items:  crack cocaine, drug-dealing paraphernalia, four 
handguns, a shotgun, a rifle, a machine gun, a machete, a crossbow, live rounds of 
ammunition, and an M-1000 explosive device). 
143 Id.  The district court agreed as to the house, and suppressed all evidence found 
therein.  Id.  The government appealed the decision, and Henderson moved to dismiss the 
government’s appeal and cross-appealed as to the search of the car—the latter of which he 
later voluntarily dismissed.  Id. at 778 n.1.  After both parties filed briefs, the appellate court 
denied the motion to dismiss.  Id. at 778. 
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consent was no longer an effective bar to another co-tenant’s consent.144  
Narrowly distinguishing the case from Randolph, the court reasoned that 
parties denying consent do not have an absolute veto, and they cannot 
expect their denial of consent to be effective for an indeterminate time 
after they leave.145 
While these cases all received review from their respective circuit 
courts because of Randolph, the decisions confirm the prediction that 
courts would continue to apply prior third-party consent law.146  While 
the Randolph decision did not purport to overrule the previous third-
party consent decisions, commentators and lower courts have 
erroneously further limited Randolph, rendering the decision almost 
useless as a precedential opinion.147  The question thus arises how courts 
should resolve the problems created, or left unanswered, by Randolph 
and appellate court interpretations thereof.148 
III.  ANALYSIS 
These questions of how to resolve the issue with third-party consent 
law are not ones that courts can easily answer by looking to Randolph 
itself.149  By circumventing and limiting the breadth of Randolph’s 
holding, lower courts have eroded the potential for a clear standard of 
third-party consent law founded in Randolph.150  This is troubling 
                                                 
144 Id. at 785.  The court viewed the physical presence and immediate objection to the 
other co-tenant’s consent as indispensable to the Randolph decision, and thus, found Matlock 
and Rodriguez the more apt law to follow.  Id. at 783.  
145 Id. at 785.  Noting that the Randolph court went out of its way to limit the holding to 
the specific factual scenario, the court found the position of the Ninth Circuit and dissent 
untenable because it required expanding the Randolph holding to other scenarios, which 
goes against the expressly narrow holding.  Id. at 784–85. 
146 Madeline E. McNeeley, Note, Constitutional Law—Search and Seizure—Validity of 
Consent to Warrantless Search of Residence When Co-Occupant Expressly Objects, 74 TENN. L. 
REV. 259, 274 (2007) (stating that the Supreme Court would be well-advised to hear another 
case on the subject, as Randolph offers almost no precedential value because it is 
exceedingly narrow). 
147 See supra notes 127 and 137 (examples of courts narrowing the decision even further); 
see also Monique N. Bhargava, Note, Protecting Privacy in a Shared Castle—The Implications of 
Georgia v. Randolph for the Third Party Consent Doctrine, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1009, 1010–11 
(2008) (stating that the decision is based on a “social expectations” analysis that is 
applicable only to set circumstances, thus allowing courts to minimize the impact of the 
case). 
148 See infra Parts III, IV (contemplating the question, and the ideal approach to resolve 
said problems). 
149 See infra Part III.B (explaining the shortcomings of the Randolph decision, particularly 
the faults of the social-expectations test on which Randolph is predicated). 
150 See supra Part II.F; infra Part III.A (discussing the current split among Circuit Courts of 
Appeals and the accompanying rationales by each court for granting varying breadth to the 
Randolph holding); see also Godfrey & Levine, supra note 28, at 746–47 (stating that because 
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because a clear and concise standard would be helpful to police officers 
and courts.151  Only the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
Randolph could apply to cases with factual dissimilarities, while the other 
circuits distinguished their cases based on dissimilarities.152  Because 
outcome-determinative factual distinctions prevent reconciling the 
circuit courts of appeals’ decisions, the rationales each lower court 
offered for distinguishing their cases from one another and Randolph are 
especially interesting.153 
Addition to the current framework by Randolph and the appellate 
interpretations thereof only further convolutes the already complicated 
body of third-party consent law.154  This is especially disappointing 
given that the majority in Randolph began to articulate what could have 
been the basis for a sensible and concise reasonableness balancing 
approach to third-party consent, but instead chose not to use this 
approach as the basis for its holding.155  Given the concerns plaguing the 
Randolph decision, further Supreme Court clarification of third-party 
                                                                                                             
Randolph applies only in certain limited factual circumstances, and because there are so 
many bases for distinguishing the case, courts may have difficulty in determining when or 
if it applies). 
151 See infra Part III.B (indicating the importance of an easily accessible standard for police 
officers and courts to apply). 
152 See supra Part II.F (discussing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s rationale for 
extending Randolph to its facts, and the Seventh and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals’ 
rationales for distinguishing Randolph from their facts). 
153 Without the possibility of distinguishing the cases, there is no danger that future 
interpretations will use the factual differences between the cases to explain away the 
different outcomes, meaning that there is a bona fide dispute among the courts.  See 
Henderson, 536 F.3d at 783 (stating “Hudspeth and Murphy are materially indistinguishable 
from each other and from this case[,]” but all three cases bear more similarity to Matlock 
and Rodriguez than they do to Randolph). 
154 See Bhargava, supra note 147, at 1040 (“[T]he Supreme Court succeeded in producing a 
decision which inexplicably deviated from previous Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and 
further complicated the third-party consent doctrine for courts and police.”). 
155 See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 114–17 (2006).   
Since the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third party has no 
recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present 
and objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation, without more, gives a 
police officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the 
officer would have in the absence of any consent at all.  Accordingly, in 
the balancing of competing individual and governmental interests 
entailed by the bar to unreasonable searches, the cooperative 
’occupant’s invitation adds nothing to the ’government’s side to 
counter the force of an objecting ’individual’s claim to security against 
the ’government’s intrusion into his dwelling place. 
Id. at 114–15 (citation omitted) (significantly, the Court’s discussion of the circumstances 
with reference to how the scales do not tip in either side’s favor “without more”).  The 
Court instead used the social-expectations test.  Id. 
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consent law is necessary.156  A future decision by the Court will need to 
establish a test that lower courts can easily apply and that police officers, 
seeking to determine if they can conduct a search, can easily 
understand.157 
To the end of creating such an easy-to-apply test, this Part analyzes 
the current state of third-party consent law following Randolph and the 
appellate cases interpreting it.158  Part III.A considers the appellate court 
decisions, specifically flaws in Randolph that the decisions illuminated, 
and the strengths of each lower court decision.159  Part III.B concentrates 
on these flaws, analyzes the viability of the social-expectations test, and 
evaluates it against the reasonableness test the Randolph majority 
discussed in dicta.160  Part III.C addresses the substance of countervailing 
public policy, the influence these concerns have had on courts, and the 
accuracy of scholarly concerns regarding the public policy issues.161  
Finally, Part III.D summarizes the current law and discusses briefly how 
third-party consent law should continue to develop.162 
A. Appellate Court Decisions 
The contradictory appellate decisions of Murphy, Hudspeth, and 
Henderson only increased uncertainty of the Randolph standard.163  The 
Seventh and Eighth Circuits, when deciding their cases in light of 
Randolph, focused on the factual basis for Randolph’s holding rather than 
the rules upon which the Court predicated its holding.164  This focus is 
                                                 
156 See infra Part III.A (discussing the ease with which courts have limited Randolph by 
distinguishing it and the flaws with the social-expectations analysis). 
157 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120–21 (discussing the “practical value” of simple and clear 
rules because they will be less time consuming to interpret for courts and police officers in 
the field). 
158 See infra Parts III.A–D (critiquing the areas of third-party consent law impacted by the 
Randolph decision). 
159 See infra Part III.A (discussing the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit cases creating 
the split). 
160 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the flawed social-expectations test, and indicating where 
these flaws could be corrected with the reasonableness balancing approach). 
161 See infra Part III.C (analyzing the law of third-party consent’s effect on individual 
privacy and domestic violence). 
162 See infra Part III.D (providing a brief conclusion and look forward into third-party 
consent law). 
163 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the ways in which these appellate decisions arrived at 
substantively different conclusions when interpreting the same legal rules, and almost 
identical factual scenarios). 
164 See Henderson, 536 F.3d at 785 (neglecting to answer the philosophical question of 
what social expectations in the factual circumstances would dictate because Randolph “went 
out of its way to limit its holding to the circumstances of the case:  a disputed consent by 
two then-present residents with authority.”); Hudspeth, 518 F.3d at 960 (ignoring the 
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understandable, given that the Court explicitly limited its holding to 
narrow factual circumstances to avoid overruling Matlock and 
Rodriguez.165  However, these lower courts placed such an emphasis on 
the limited nature of Randolph’s holding that they refused to apply the 
Randolph standard to any other factual circumstances.166 
The Hudspeth majority illuminated another flaw in the Randolph 
rule—that police could remove an objecting co-tenant and later obtain 
consent from another co-tenant.167  This would be permissible because 
the objecting co-tenant would no longer be physically present, as 
required by Randolph, to renew his objection.168  This application of 
Randolph allows police to isolate a co-tenant who they anticipate will not 
object to the search and to secure that co-tenant’s consent away from the 
objecting co-tenant.169  In Hudspeth, the police took this rule a step 
further, arresting Hudspeth away from the premises after he objected to 
the search and later requesting his wife’s consent to a search.170  As 
illustrated by Hudspeth, police officers may exploit a fact-sensitive rule 
and circumvent its intent by acting in ways that tailor factual 
circumstances so as to avoid the rule.171 
The Randolph Court attempted to prevent circumvention of the law 
by adding social expectations to the fact-sensitive inquiry.172  However, 
                                                                                                             
principles of Randolph because the facts do not fit the “fine line” drawn by the Court in 
Randolph). 
165 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121.  Instead, the Court fashioned a rule that it felt would serve 
as a companion rule to Matlock and Rodriguez.  Id. 
[W]e have to admit that we are drawing a fine line [with the 
holding] . . . there is practical value in the simple clarity of 
complementary rules, one recognizing the co-tenant’s permission 
when there is no fellow occupant on hand, the other according 
dispositive weight to the fellow occupant’s contrary indication when 
he expresses it. 
Id. at 121–22. 
166 See Henderson, 536 F.3d at 784 (“[T]he specific limiting language in the majority 
opinion itself, convince[s] us that Randolph’s holding ought not be extended beyond the 
circumstances at issue there.”); see also Hudspeth, 518 F.3d at 960 (arguing that the “fine 
line” drawn by Randolph requires that the defendant be both physically present and voice 
an immediate objection, otherwise Randolph is inapplicable). 
167 See Hudspeth, 518 F.3d at 960. 
168 See id. 
169 See id. at 959 (reaffirming the Randolph principle that a nearby co-tenant who does not 
participate in the dialogue “loses out” on being able to deny consent). 
170 Id. at 955–56.  Hudspeth’s wife was unaware that her husband had denied the police 
consent to search when they asked for her consent while at the Hudspeth residence.  Id. 
171 See infra Part IV (proposing a balancing test to replace the current fact-sensitive rules 
that can be easily exploited or misunderstood by police and courts). 
172 See supra Part II.E (discussing the Court’s addition of social expectations, which would 
require courts to consider whether the typical caller would enter in light of the 
circumstances, to Randolph to prevent circumvention of the law). 
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decisions of the Seventh and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals reveal the 
flaws of the social-expectations test, with majority and dissenting 
opinions in each that found varying social expectations for different 
factual scenarios.173  If one court cannot surmise the same social 
expectations from the facts before it, it is difficult to expect uniform 
application by different courts throughout the country.174  These 
differences also illustrate another problem with Randolph—even with its 
“bright line” holding, the Court did not clarify whether the objecting co-
tenant’s geographic location affects his power to object.175 
Only the Ninth Circuit granted Randolph precedential value, and 
while this decision was favorable for its broadness, it is not likely to 
become the majority view because it interpreted Randolph expansively.176  
This decision would be favorable because of its willingness to grant 
power to one co-tenant’s denial of consent without distorting the 
analysis by considering geographic location or other factors not 
contemplated by Randolph.177  However, the Murphy interpretation has its 
own flaws, mostly because of the emphasis it places on the Court’s 
                                                 
173 See Henderson, 536 F.3d at 786–87 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (arguing that his colleague’s 
are incorrect in concluding that once an objecting co-tenant is no longer present, a guest 
would not consider the absent co-tenant’s objection.  Rovner “doubt[s] that a social visitor 
would feel welcome in a shared residence once the visitor has been told by one of the 
tenants to stay out, especially in the profanity-laced manner employed by Henderson[,]” 
contending that only in a Hobbesian world would social obligations be limited to what an 
individual was present to physically enforce); see also Hudspeth, 518 F.3d at 964 (Melloy, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the expectation of privacy that one enjoys in one’s own home is 
not contingent on geographic location, as the majority contends it is). 
174 See infra Part III.B (discussing the shortcomings of the social-expectations  test, 
including the likelihood that the standard will vary greatly in different localities, due to 
cultural norms, among other things, affecting social expectations). 
175 See Hudspeth, 518 F.3d at 963 (Melloy, J., dissenting).  Melloy argues that the majority 
in Hudspeth distinguished Hudspeth from Randolph because the defendant in Hudspeth was 
not physically present, when Randolph never explicitly required the defendant be physically 
present as a prerequisite for withholding consent.  Id.  Rather, the dissent claims, “the 
Supreme Court’s language reflects a geographic mandate, but rather a conscious effort to 
‘“‘decide the case before [it], not a different one.’’”  Id. (quoting Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120 
n.8).  See also Henderson, 536 F.3d at 786 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“My colleagues conclude 
that Henderson’s valid arrest and removal from the scene sapped his objection of its force 
and allowed the police to search the house with Patricia Henderson’s consent.  In my view, 
this interprets the admittedly limited Randolph decision too narrowly.”). 
176 See Craig M. Bradley, Supreme Court Review:  The Case of the Uncooperative Husband, 42 
TRIAL 68, 68 (June 2006) (discussing how the Court went out of its way to stress the 
narrowness of its holding). 
177 See Williams, supra note 91, at 958–59 (contending that the broad view of Randolph is 
favorable because it is consistent with prior Supreme Court third-party consent 
jurisprudence, and because it preserves the holdings of Matlock and Rodriguez, while still 
granting Randolph some effect). 
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social-expectations test.178  Part III.B discusses the flaws of courts 
engaging in a social-expectations analysis similar to the Randolph Court’s 
and centers around the subjectivity of social expectations and the 
difficulty of establishing uniform social expectations.179 
B. Reasonableness Dicta and the Social-Expectations Test 
The Randolph Court’s attempt to wedge Randolph as a companion to 
Matlock and Rodriguez failed because of the difficulty the lower courts 
had in discerning Randolph’s standards and the ease lower courts have 
had in distinguishing factually similar cases from Randolph.180  Instead, 
the Court should have advocated a reasonableness approach deriving 
from the factors it implicitly presented while discussing the 
circumstances in which police may be able to enter premises without 
consent.181  Had the Court used this as the basis for a reasonableness 
analysis in its opinion, it would have created a simple and consistent 
standard for courts and law enforcement officials to determine the 
validity of third-party consent.182 
Rather than focusing on the analysis of reasonableness, the majority 
in Randolph based its decision on a flawed analysis of social 
expectations.183  In an effort to bolster the social-expectations test, the 
majority and commentators have pointed to its use in prior third-party 
                                                 
178 See Murphy, 516 F.3d at 1119; see also infra Part III.B (discussing the flaws of the social-
expectations analysis as employed by the Randolph Court). 
179 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the Court’s attempt to bolster its rule in Randolph with 
the social-expectations test, which has proven unsuccessful due to the subjectivity and 
uncertainty of social expectations). 
180 See supra Part II.F (discussing the facts and holdings of Hudspeth and Henderson, and 
the ease with which the courts distinguished those cases from Randolph by referring to the 
Randolph Court’s desire to draw a bright-line rule applicable to very limited factual 
circumstances). 
181 See generally Murphy, 516 F.3d at 1124–25.  Given that the Ninth Circuit has been the 
only court unwilling to avoid presumptuously by arbitrarily limiting Randolph and the only 
court willing to extend Randolph to facts deviating even mildly beyond its holding, this 
seems to be the only way to give the Randolph decision precedential value.  Id. 
182 See generally Randolph, 547 U.S. at 142 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing how the 
“case-by-case” standard that the majority uses will soon become analogous to Matlock and 
Rodriguez and suggesting that a better standard is needed to avoid a scenario similar to 
Randolph, where “[t]he end result is a complete lack of practical guidance for the police in 
the field, let alone for the lower courts”). 
183 See Bhargava, supra note 147, at 1021 (“The ‘social expectations’ analysis applied by 
the majority is largely unsupported by evidence and does not provide the necessary 
foundation for the Court’s conclusions.”); see also Dery & Hernandez, supra note 91, at 84 
(“The unintended legacy of Randolph could thus be distrustful citizens and willfully 
ignorant police, the very antithesis of the values of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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consent cases, noting its effectiveness in those cases.184  What the 
majority fails to note, however, is that the Court previously had not used 
the social-expectations test for the issue of consent.185 
The social-expectations analysis falters given the myriad of subtleties 
that can inform one’s social expectations, which would cause difficulty in 
administering a social-expectations test without subjectivity.186  One of 
the greatest concerns surrounding social expectations is that they vary 
according to local culture, so the outcomes of cases with the same facts as 
Randolph could vary from state to state.187  As the lower courts have 
demonstrated, even the same court can reach widely divergent 
conclusions about social expectations, so it is difficult to see how the test 
could receive uniform application nationwide.188  While there are some 
positives in the social-expectations analysis, it is puzzling that the Court 
based its holding on social expectations rather than on a more concrete 
and comprehensive analysis.189 
                                                 
184 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111 (“The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness in the consent cases, then, is the great significance given to widely shared 
social expectations, which are naturally enough influenced by the law of property, but not 
controlled by its rules.”); see also Williams, supra note 91, at 958–59 (discussing the usage of 
the test in Matlock and Rodriguez, and advocating the Randolph social-expectations  test, as it 
“is in “harmony” with” those cases). 
185 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 130–31 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  “[T]he social-expectations  
concept has not been applied to all questions arising under the Fourth Amendment, least of 
all issues of consent.”  Id. at 130.  Chief Justice Roberts asserts that the Fourth Amendment 
cases the majority cites for supporting the notion that social expectations are an element 
into a Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry actually refer to a “legitimate 
expectation of privacy.”  Id. at 131 (citation omitted); see also Eden, supra note 54, at 201 
(noting that the social-expectations  analysis’s complete absence from the Matlock and 
Rodriguez decisions suggests that the analysis is not so crucial to Fourth Amendment law). 
186 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 131 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“A wide variety of often subtle 
social conventions may shape expectations about how we act when another shares with us 
what is otherwise private, and those conventions go by a variety of labels—courtesy, good 
manners, custom, protocol, even honor among thieves.”); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 27, 
at 108 (“The pertinent social expectations will almost always turn on the specific identity of 
the caller, including his relationship to and knowledge of the individual claiming a privacy 
violation.”); Eden, supra note 54, at 200 (stating that the social-expectations  test has an 
uncertain foundation, and that the application of the analysis is at best an educated guess 
as to how modern co-tenants interact). 
187 See Spencer, supra note 27, at 850–51.  Spencer anticipates this problem with the social-
expectations test, and suggests that the Supreme Court propose “baseline” decisions that 
detail the most basic privacy expectations, rather than attempting to dictate or determine 
the social expectations of each state.  Id.  However, this would require local courts to 
interpret their own constitutions independent from federal provisions, instead of just 
duplicative, and would add their own state’s norms to the equation.  Id. at 851.  
188 See supra Part III.A (discussing the disagreements between justices in the same lower 
court cases as to what the social expectations in each circumstance dictated). 
189 See Gold, supra note 25, at 402–04 (arguing that Randolph’s social-expectations analysis 
has provided an important compliment to Matlock and Rodriguez because it considers 
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The Court alluded to the ability of courts and police officers to 
consider social expectations as one of several inquiries before 
searching.190  Rather than explain some of these other variables, the 
Court should have enumerated additional factors and incorporated them 
into a reasonableness test that considered social expectations as one 
factor for evaluating consent.191  Commentators and courts alike have 
become understandably fixated on the murkiness of social expectations, 
so a different standard is necessary.192  By emphasizing the social-
expectations test, the Randolph holding allows lower courts to decide 
cases without considering objective criteria, which ultimately could 
result in courts subverting the Randolph standard.193 
However, treating social expectations as only one element of the 
inquiry would minimize the potential for subjectivity.194  With a multi-
factored reasonableness test, a court would grant weight to other 
pertinent factors the current approach ignores.195  Granted, in this 
analysis subjectivity would still be present, but the likelihood that one 
individual’s aberrant social expectations would create an improper 
                                                                                                             
modern shared living arrangements and maintains the “owner” of each room’s subjective 
intent to privacy). 
190 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115–17 (discussing additional factors, such as hot pursuit, 
protection of domestic violence victims, protecting the safety of police officers, and other 
factors that would justify police entering the premises without a warrant). 
191 See infra Part IV (proposing a reasonableness test that retains, yet minimizes, social 
expectations and considers other pertinent factors). 
192 See Godfrey & Levine, supra note 28, at 746–47 (engaging in a prolonged discussion of 
the uncertainty of the specific social expectations present in Randolph). 
193 See Zakai, supra note 113, at 449 (asserting that, in addition to objective reasons for 
distinguishing Randolph, lower courts are finding other reasons to distinguish Randolph, as 
they are concerned about its public policy implications). 
194 See Peter B. Rutledge, Miranda and Reasonableness, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1011, 1018 
(2005).   
[O]ne tempting alternative [is] a blended approach.  That is to say that 
the inquiry is ultimately an objective one but the subjective 
considerations are relevant to the inquiry.  Such an approach holds 
open the balance of operating as a type of “‘meta-principle’” that 
allows for all of the preceding values to factor into the mix and to 
allow a court to choose among them in a given case. 
Id. 
195 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 140 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  Other factors generally fall 
under the categories of the likelihood of harm to governmental interests by not conducting 
the search and the probability of harm to individual interests by conducting the search.  Id.  
In balancing competing individual and governmental interests in conducting searches, the 
Court explicitly stated that exigent circumstances—such as hot pursuit, protecting the 
safety of the police officers, imminent destruction to building, likelihood that suspect will 
imminently flee, expedient law enforcement—with additional reason for conducting the 
search—including disputed permission, protection of one’s home, and social 
expectations—can help determine the reasonableness of conducting a search.  Id. 
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outcome is minimized.196  The appropriate method for analysis must also 
consider other concerns elucidated by the appellate courts; therefore, 
Part III.C discusses the central areas of public policy concerns.197 
C. Public Policy Concerns 
Shortly after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Randolph, commentators advocating various public policy interests began 
expressing concern about the decision; these concerns have been 
exacerbated by the appellate courts’ application of Randolph.198  The 
balancing test that the Randolph Court discusses in passing addresses two 
primary public policy concerns in third-party consent cases:  (1) 
individual privacy rights and (2) governmental interests.199  In Fourth 
Amendment cases, individual privacy rights typically arise because of a 
person’s expectation that the government will not unreasonably intrude 
upon his or her home.200  Governmental interest typically is to protect 
domestic violence victims, which is a palpable concern because of the 
staggering number of reported intimate-partner violence incidents in the 
United States.201 
                                                 
196 See generally Cyrus E. Dugger, Rights Waiting for Change:  Socio-Economic Rights in New 
South Africa, 19 FLA. J. INT’L L. 195, 275–76 (2007) (citing United States v. Carroll Towing, 
159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)).  Dugger generally discusses Judge Hand’s belief that 
incorporating objective elements, such as probability, would result in a more objective 
reasonableness standard.  Id.  This is true primarily because the additional objective 
variables minimize the impact of each nonobjective variable.  Id.  Therefore, one 
miscalculated variable will not be as damaging to the entire analysis.  Id.  The analysis still 
has potential for subjectivity due to the subjective variables, but the objective variables 
strengthen the analysis’s objectivity.  Id. 
197 See infra Part III.C (addressing the concerns of protecting individual privacy rights and 
potential domestic violence victims). 
198 See infra Part IV.C (discussing commentator criticism of Randolph’s treatment of 
important public policy concerns). 
199 547 U.S. 103, 115–116 (2006) (phrasing these competing interests initially as the 
“individual’s claim to security against the government’’s intrusion into his dwelling place,” 
while simply describing governmental interests as something more than a “generalized 
interest in expedient law enforcement”). 
200 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999) (“The Fourth Amendment embodies this 
centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home.”); see also Warren & Brandeis, 
supra note 25, at 193.  In one of the earliest discussions of what privacy entails, Warren and 
Brandies advocate privacy as “the right to be let alone.”  Id. 
201 See Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate 
Partner Violence:  Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey, NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE iii (2000), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/181867.htm.  
According to a 1995–96 study, approximately 32.6 percent of all Americans are physically 
or sexually assaulted by an intimate partner at some point in their lives.  Id.; Patricia Tjaden 
& Nancy Thoennes, Full Report of the Prevalence, Incidence, and Consequences of Intimate 
Partner Violence Against Women:  Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey, 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE  iv (2000), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-
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The Randolph Court did an insufficient job of protecting individual 
privacy rights because it left too great a potential for police to circumvent 
the protection Randolph supposedly offers.202  Both the Hudspeth and 
Henderson courts have demonstrated this in their conclusions that 
Randolph protects only a physically present objecting co-tenant.203  Under 
this interpretation, there is too great a chance that police will simply 
work around individual rights by separating co-tenants before they can 
voice objections.204  Further, the standard does nothing to protect co-
tenants in any other scenarios, which is cause for concern in light of the 
erosion of privacy rights in third-party consent cases before Randolph.205 
One positive result courts can achieve by applying Randolph is 
increased protection for domestic violence victims.206  This is true despite 
the majority’s holding that the decision “has no bearing on the capacity 
of the police . . . to protect a resident from domestic violence” because 
the Court performs the important task of clarifying existing means of 
police protection for domestic violence victims.207  Still, given the high 
                                                                                                             
sum/183781.htm.  More than two million men and women are physically assaulted by an 
intimate partner in the United States each year.  Id. 
202 See Dery & Hernandez, supra note 91, at 55 (stating that the Court’s bright-line rule 
relies too heavily on a potential defendant’s physical location, and could allow police to 
remove a potential objector from the scene so long as there is no evidence that that was the 
purpose of the removal). 
203 See supra Part II.F (discussing the limited holdings of Hudspeth and Henderson). 
204 See Dery & Hernandez, supra note 91, at 82 (“The differing results in Randolph and 
Matlock thus send a strong signal to police—should you wish to enter a home without a 
warrant, isolate the most likely potential objector so that you may ask permission from 
those more willing to allow entry.”). 
205 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 134 n.1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).   
[T]he differences between the majority and this dissent reduce to this:  
Under the majority’s view, police may not enter and search when an 
objecting co-occupant is present at the door, but they may do so when he 
is asleep in the next room; under our view, the co-occupant’s consent is 
effective in both cases.  It seems a bit overwrought to characterize the 
former approach as affording great protection to a man in his castle, 
the latter as signaling that “‘the centuries of special protection for the 
privacy of the home are over.’” 
Id. (citation omitted); see also Wright, supra note 40, at 1871 (discussing the ease with 
which police could circumvent the Matlock rule by removing a potential objector from 
the scene to avoid an objection and obtaining consent to search the premises from 
another party, signifying a weakening of individual privacy rights). 
206 See infra notes 207–09 and accompanying text (noting how the Court clarified how the 
standard could interact with rules of exigency, and this alone will provide some guidance 
to police officers in the field). 
207 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 104.  The majority contends that in asserting that the holding 
would harm domestic violence victims, the dissent conflates when the police may enter 
without committing a trespass with when the police may enter to search for evidence.  Id. 
Bricker: Bad Application of a Bad Standard:  The Bungling of Georgia v. Ra
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
458 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
bar for meeting the exigency standards, these protections still may not be 
enough.208 
Some scholars have expressed further concern because Randolph does 
nothing to protect domestic violence victims when it is not clear to police 
that domestic violence is occurring.209  Because Randolph deals with 
scenarios in which police interact with the potential domestic violence 
parties and provides police an appropriate standard to satisfy in order to 
enter to stop domestic violence, it gives the police ample entry 
opportunity to stop domestic violence from occurring if they have reason 
to be aware that it is occurring.210 
It is unreasonable to direct at Randolph the grievance that police may 
not always recognize domestic violence as it is occurring, when it is 
simply a natural result of the fact that police work involves human error, 
and thus is imperfect.211  Given that protecting potential victims of 
domestic violence is not the only aim of third-party consent law, the 
courts are forced to accept compromises that provide substantial 
protection to domestic violence victims while still protecting an 
                                                 
208 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (holding that a search may be conducted only 
when the exigency is absolutely compelling or certain, and not when it is merely likely or 
even probable). 
209 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 140 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  In his dissent, Chief Justice 
Roberts objects to the majority’s rule because he feels it would be more logical for the rule 
to address domestic-violence concerns directly by always allowing one tenant’s consent to 
search to trump another tenant’s objection, rather than have exceptions to the rule.  Id.  
Roberts’s dissent proves unpersuasive, as he provides little substantive rationale to explain 
his issue with the exception, instead attacking it for “alter[ing] a great deal of established 
Fourth Amendment law.”  Id.; see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 63, at 808–09 (objecting to 
Randolph because it does not allow one co-tenant’s consent to trump another co-tenant’s 
objections to allow police to always enter, which would always protect domestic violence 
victims, but rather, requires a showing that police have reason to believe domestic violence 
is occurring or is likely to occur before entering to protect domestic violence victims); 
Zakai, supra note 113, at 452.  Zakai argues that the Randolph standard may cause police to 
hesitate before searching a premise when it is not clear whether domestic violence is 
occurring, because it would then not be clear whether exigent circumstances were present.  
Id.  Zakai bases this on Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent.  Id. 
210 Rasch-Chabot, supra note 78, at 516 (“[S]ufficient tools . . . previously held 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, remain at the disposal of law enforcement to 
aid them in effectively protecting victims of domestic violence.”). 
211 See generally Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, But Not Always Harmless:  When 
Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1199 (1995) (examining human 
police error and the impossibility of police administering the law perfectly); Steven 
Wisotsky, Miscarriages of Justice:  Their Causes and Cures, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 547, 552–67 
(1997) (discussing how human error impacts police work, when it should be tolerated, and 
how it can be minimized but not completely eliminated); Jonathan B. Zeitlin, Voluntariness 
with a Vengeance:  Miranda and a Modern Alternative, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 109, 110 (stating 
that, given human nature, it is unreasonable to expect police officers to make no errors 
when investigating crimes). 
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individual’s right to privacy.212  As argued, the reasonableness balancing 
approach would be the optimal approach to third-party consent, as it 
would address current public policy concerns raised by the Randolph 
standard by granting sufficient protection to the two countervailing 
interests.213 
D. The Future of Third-Party Consent Law 
It is difficult to predict how the Court will treat the Randolph decision 
if one of these many lower court cases receives the grant of certiorari.214  
Because of difficulty lower courts have had interpreting the 
requirements of the bright-line rule, the likelihood of courts misapplying 
the social-expectations  test, and the difficulty the test presents to police 
officers in the field, a new cohesive standard is necessary.215  It seems 
logical that the Court would adopt a reasonableness test similar to the 
one in Randolph’s dicta because of the ease with which the lower courts 
could apply it and its positive treatment of public policy concerns.216  
Clearly, the scant mention of factors in Randolph does not even begin to 
contemplate how a test would operate or what variables it would 
consider, but it will be interesting to see how the Court credits the 
origins of such a test, if it arrives at one.217 
                                                 
212 See Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995) (“[W]hether a 
particular search meets the reasonableness standard ‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on 
the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.’” (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 
619 (1989))); see also Zakai, supra note 113, at 449 (noting the importance in Fourth 
Amendment cases of balancing governmental interests with individual privacy interests to 
adequately protect both). 
213 See supra notes 198–210 and accompanying text (explaining the precise concerns and 
the merits of each such concern). 
214  See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 141 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Perhaps one day, as the 
consequences of the majority’s analytic approach become clearer, today’s opinion will be 
treated the same way the majority treats our opinions in Matlock and Rodriguez—as a ‘loose 
end’ to be tied up.”) (citation omitted);  see also supra Parts II.F, III.A (discussing the lower 
court cases, the conflicts between the cases, and the problems with each, all of which justify 
the Court revisiting this case). 
215 See supra Parts III.A–B (enumerating the various factors that have made Randolph 
difficult to apply). 
216 See infra Part IV.A (discussing the benefits of such a test as compared to the social-
expectations analysis the Court conducts in Randolph). 
217 Specifically, the question is whether the Court will show a reluctance to admit that 
Randolph was poorly decided and attempt to expand its holding by modifying the 
reasonableness balancing approach or whether it will expressly overrule Randolph with 
such an approach. 
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IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
The approach to third-party consent law under Randolph and its 
predecessors offers multiple convoluted approaches, making it difficult 
for courts and law enforcement officials to determine which rule governs 
under the particular circumstances confronting them.218  A 
reasonableness approach considering factors similar to those discussed 
by the Court’s dicta in Randolph can best address the overly complicated 
and exceptions-laden patchwork of third-party consent law and 
resulting inconsistent applications of it.219 
In establishing such a reasonableness test, four prongs would aid in 
producing an objective and accurate balancing test.220  Those prongs are:  
(1) the likelihood of harm to governmental interests by not conducting 
the search; (2) the probability of harm to individual interests by 
conducting the search; (3) the likelihood of harm to individuals by not 
conducting the search; and (4) the social expectations of the situation.221  
Such a test would grant weight to the governmental and individual 
interests, and also consider social expectations which would bolster 
factors otherwise ignored by the other prongs of the test.222 
This section considers the proposed approach, beginning in Part 
IV.A with a discussion of the benefits to courts and police of replacing 
the current mix of rules with a single reasonableness balancing 
approach.223  Part IV.B then considers the critiques offered to the 
Randolph standard and the proposed approach to addressing these 
concerns.224  Finally, Part IV.C concludes with an explanation of the 
benefits of the reasonableness balancing approach on public policy 
concerns raised by third-party consent law.225 
                                                 
218 See supra Parts II.C–F (explaining the approaches of the landmark third-party consent 
cases and the circuit court cases interpreting Randolph). 
219 See supra Part III.B (critiquing the Randolph holding and encouraging the adoption of a 
balancing approach considering factors discussed by the majority in Randolph). 
220 See supra notes 189–94 and accompanying text (contemplating the need for multiple 
factors to minimize the inherent subjectivity in each such factor). 
221 See supra notes 190–95 and accompanying text (discussing the factors discussed by the 
Court in Randolph and advocating  similar tests composed of said factors). 
222 See supra notes 173–79 and accompanying text (discussing the need to minimize the 
subjectivity of the social-expectations test and the best means of doing so). 
223 See infra Part IV.A (evaluating the proposed reasonableness approach against the 
social-expectations test and enumerating the benefits of the former approach). 
224 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the critiques offered by the lower courts and Chief 
Justice Roberts’ dissent in Randolph). 
225 See infra Part IV.C (discussing the benefits of the reasonableness approach to 
combating domestic violence and preserving individual privacy). 
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A. Practical Benefits of the Reasonableness Approach to Courts and Police 
Current fact-sensitive approaches are failing because the law is 
disjointed and difficult for police and courts to apply.226  This difficulty, 
as it relates to Randolph and its progeny, is caused partially by the social-
expectations standard utilized in Randolph.227  The social-expectations 
standard is too subjective for use as a legal standard because widely 
divergent social expectations inform each justice who considers the 
case.228  Adding to the difficulty is that the current rules vary based upon 
the factual circumstances; Randolph is a prime example of this, with its 
limited holding that applies only to a very specific factual scenario.229  
These issues with third-party consent law have caused difficulties in 
administering the law and protecting public policy interests, and thus, 
necessitate a new clear-cut standard.230  In order to implement such an 
approach, the Supreme Court would need to grant certiorari to one of 
the aforementioned cases from the Seventh, Eighth or Ninth Circuits.231  
In that reconsideration, the Court would be advised to overrule virtually 
the entire body of third-party consent law by instituting a reasonableness 
approach for all situations involving third-party consent.232 
The proposed reasonableness balancing test is easier for courts and 
police to apply given that it is more intuitive and relies less on subjective 
determinations.233  A reasonableness approach would ease the burden on 
lower courts by providing one cohesive standard regardless of the 
                                                 
226 See supra Part III.B (commenting on the difficulty for courts and police to apply the 
current law). 
227 See supra Parts III.A–B (explaining the difficulties caused by the social-expectations 
test). 
228 See supra Part III.A (discussing the decisions of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits in 
interpreting Randolph, in which majority and dissenting opinions in each case found 
different social expectations). 
229 See Part II.E (explaining the Randolph Court’s attempt to issue a fact-sensitive rule). 
230 Given the current smorgasbord of third-party consent law, unless it is to continue 
with its propensity to establish inconsistent and individualized rules, the Court will need 
to overrule previous decisions in order to establish a more unified rule. 
231 See supra Part II.F (explaining the current circuit split in interpreting Randolph is 
indicative of the flaws in the Randolph holding). 
232 See infra notes 234–40 and accompanying text (contending that the balancing approach 
would be easier to apply than the current multifarious approach). 
233 Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, Beyond the Roe Debate:  Judicial Experience with the 
1980s “Reasonableness” Test, 76 VA. L. REV. 519, 533, 538 (1990) (asserting that the 
reasonableness standard does not create a burden on lower courts because of the ease and 
practicality of its application); see also Stephen D. Thill, Assigning Error to Viar v. North 
Carolina Department of Transportation and State v. Hart:  A Proposal for Revision of the North 
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1799, 1834 (2007) (contending that a 
reasonableness standard is easier to apply than other standards because it is encountered in 
a wide number of judicial contexts). 
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factual scenario and allowing the court to weigh the appropriate 
variables.234  This would also be more effective for law enforcement 
officials, given the time-sensitive nature of their work.235  They would no 
longer have to seek legal counsel prior to seeking consent because of the 
unforeseeable outcomes of convoluted approaches, but could simply 
consider the circumstances, and act accordingly.236 
Circumstances vary widely, and officers handling the situations are 
best able to consider the situation and grant each the appropriate weight, 
so the proposed reasonableness approach utilizes factors that an 
ordinary police officer would naturally consider when determining the 
efficacy of a third party’s consent.237  Granted, the reasonableness test 
still allows police offers to exercise discretion, and is thus subjective, but 
the standard offers the most objective approach possible.238  
Additionally, objectivity adds to the fair and uniform application of the 
law, so considerations naturally made by the police officer must be 
counterbalanced with factors limiting discretion.239  In sum, the proposed 
reasonableness approach would result in more consistent application of 
the law by courts, and more effective and reliable police decisions.240 
                                                 
234 See Wineholt, supra note 86, at 495 (contending that the Court’s conflation of tests, 
including the unworkable social-expectations  test, will confuse lower courts attempting to 
apply Randolph). 
235 See Lee N. Abrams, Roxane C. Busey, James R. Loftis, III & Thomas M. Wilson, III, 60 
Minutes with Laurel A. Price, Chair, National Association of Attorneys General Multistate 
Antitrust Task Force, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 247, 263 (1993) (“Time sensitivity creates an incentive 
to have all public law enforcement review completed within a discrete time frame.”).  But 
see Randolph, 547 U.S. at 116 n.5 (2006) (“A generalized interest in expedient law 
enforcement cannot, without more, justify a warrantless search.”); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) (“The warrant requirement . . . is not an inconvenience 
to be somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency.”) (citation omitted). 
236 See Bhargava, supra note 147, at 1029–30 (stating that despite Randolph’s supposed 
bright line rule, the multiple doctrines that police would have to consider when conducting 
searches have the anticipated effect of causing confusion among police officers). 
237 As appellate courts commonly defer to trial courts on issues where first-hand 
impressions are paramount, so too should courts defer to police judgment on matters 
where hearing a recitation of the facts is an inadequate substitute for experiencing the facts. 
238 See supra Part III.B (analyzing the subjectivity of the social-expectations test, and 
offering less subjective alternatives). 
239 See supra notes 234–37 and accompanying text (discussing the objectivity of specific 
prongs of the test). 
240 See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text (discussing how the approach would 
result in a more uniform application of the law by courts and provide a more manageable 
standard for police, which would then result in fewer overturned convictions). 
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B. Addressing Criticism of Georgia v. Randolph 
The reasonableness approach could also satisfy courts and critics 
taking issue with the Randolph standard.241  One of the concerns Chief 
Justice Roberts voiced about the Court’s approach in his dissent is that it 
altered “a great deal of established Fourth Amendment law.”242  Yet, in 
his analysis, the Chief Justice mistakes the application of the majority 
rule with reasonableness scenarios presented by the majority’s dicta in 
which the police would be able to enter.243  Roberts’s dissent hinges on 
his belief that the majority’s analysis altered too much third-party 
consent law for the sake of one factual scenario.244  However, his main 
qualm appears to be related to the limited case-by-case holding; if the 
added scenarios were a substantive part of the opinion rather than dicta, 
they would expand the breadth of the decision to any factual scenario 
concerning third-party consent.245  It is doubtful that Chief Justice 
Roberts would voice these same concerns if the majority opinion had 
altered so much third-party consent law for the sake of the entire body of 
law, rather than just one factual scenario.246 
In its ease of application, a reasonableness balancing approach 
would also satisfy the issues lower courts have had with the Randolph 
                                                 
241 See supra notes 163–80 and accompanying text (particularly discussing critics’ 
objections to Randolph on the grounds of it being a bright-line rule that is easily 
distinguished and difficult to understand; the reasonableness standard, which has neither 
of these issues, could satisfy these critics). 
242 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 141 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing how the Court has not 
used various considerations in determining consent that are present in the majority 
opinion, and should not, given that the decision applies only to one factual circumstance).  
243 Rasch-Chabot, supra note 78, at 515.  Rasch-Chabot contends that the dissent’s attempt 
to undermine the majority by stating that the majority created a new exception to the 
warrant requirement fails because the majority was simply stating how its rule would 
interact with other, already existing, variables.  Id.  Further, Rasch-Chabot contends that the 
police would be able to enter in these circumstances, regardless of the Randolph decision, 
due to exigency.  Id. 
244 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 141 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  The Chief Justice states several 
times that the majority alters too much established third-party consent law, including this: 
Considering the majority’s rule is solely concerned with protecting a person who 
happens to be present at the door when a police officer asks his co-occupant for 
consent to search, but not one who is asleep in the next room or in the backyard 
gardening, the majority has taken a great deal of pain in altering Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, for precious little (if any) gain in privacy. 
Id. 
245 See id. at 142 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court’s case-by-case 
approach because it “constitutionalize[s] such an arbitrary rule” rather than utilizing a 
cohesive approach or rule). 
246 See supra notes 103–12 and accompanying text (discussing the grounds for the Chief 
Justice’s dissent). 
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standard.247  This optimal approach obviates any need to consider 
whether courts should interpret Randolph broadly or narrowly because 
the reasonableness analysis would effectively replace Randolph’s 
holding.248  It is difficult to speculate how the appellate courts would 
have resolved Murphy, Hudspeth, and Henderson in light of this 
reasonableness test, but it seems likely that the results would have been 
the same, but with different reasoning.249 
C. Public Policy Benefits of the Reasonableness Approach 
The proposed reasonableness approach would effectively balance 
the opposing public policy goals of protecting governmental and 
individual interests.250  Not conducting a search may harm governmental 
interests because a co-tenant could destroy evidence or may flee if the 
officers are required to secure a warrant.251  These interests would 
additionally extend to a number of other bona fide governmental 
interests in conducting the search.252  Individual interests include 
protecting the objecting co-tenant’s right to privacy, the consenting co-
tenant’s rights in his or her property, and protecting police officers from 
potential bodily harm.253 
In discussion of protecting governmental interests, some assert that 
police officers currently have limited authority to enter under the 
doctrine of exigency.254  However, scholars and courts alike have noted 
                                                 
247 See supra Part III.A (discussing the vast differences in interpretation between courts, 
including issues involving differing beliefs as to social expectations within the same court 
and whether an objector must be physically present at the time of the other co-tenant’s 
consent). 
248 See supra notes 231–32 (explaining how the Court would need to grant certiorari to one 
of the circuit court cases to overrule Randolph and establish the proposed balancing 
approach). 
249 See supra Parts II.F, IV.A–B.  These sections speculate as to how the reasonableness test 
would generally alter case outcomes.  While this is difficult to predict, the bases for 
reaching the same conclusions would be because the social expectations would remain 
unchanged in both cases, and the majority in both cases found the social expectations 
dictated allowing the search.  In light of there being no other reasonableness factors to add 
to either side of any of the cases (at least from the facts as currently known) it seems the 
analyses would remain unchanged. 
250 See supra Part III.C (discussing the public policy concerns created by the Randolph 
standard). 
251 See supra Part III.B (considering the primary governmental interests). 
252 See supra Part III.B (discussing the governmental interests, typically the same as those 
under the exigency doctrine, that the Randolph Court contemplated as relevant in 
determining the reasonableness of conducting a search). 
253 See supra Part III.C (noting the ways, both successfully and unsuccessfully, in which 
the current third-party consent law balances these competing interests). 
254 See supra notes 206–09 and accompanying text (discussing exigency). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 [2010], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss2/3
2010] Bad Application of a Bad Standard 465 
concern that current third-party consent law does not protect these 
interests.255  To address those concerns, the functional result of this 
reasonableness test would be a lower threshold for entering under such 
circumstances than is required under exigency.256  Some commentators 
may express apprehension that this would further erode the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but that apprehension would 
exist regardless of the rule allowing third-party consent.257  The only way 
to eliminate this concern is to eliminate the third-party consent exception 
to the warrant requirement.258 
This reasonableness test would further positive public policy goals 
by securing as much individual privacy as possible and protecting 
victims of domestic violence.259  With the proposed approach, it is 
possible that more searches would be justifiable in the face of a denial of 
consent, but this trade-off is acceptable, as the standard would protect all 
co-tenants without the possibility of police circumvention.260  The 
reasonableness approach would also protect domestic violence victims 
because it explicitly allows police lawful entry to protect a victim if the 
police have good reason to believe that domestic violence is occurring.261  
                                                 
255 See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text (noting the concerns of some courts and 
scholars who believe that the current law exacerbates the already high domestic violence 
problem in America). 
256 See supra notes 206–09 and accompanying text (elaborating on exigency).  Unlike 
under exigency, the police under the third-party consent balancing test would be able to 
enter not only when it is an emergency situation, but also whenever consent has been 
granted by at least one co-tenant, and the balance is satisfied.  The balance could 
presumably be satisfied in non-emergency situations, thus rendering the threshold lower 
than that of exigency. 
257 See supra Part II.C (explaining third-party consent and acknowledging that the body of 
law generally erodes the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement). 
258 See supra Parts II.A–C (discussing the Fourth Amendment and the exceptions thereto). 
259 See supra Part III.C (discussing the two large public policy concerns—individual 
privacy and prevention of domestic violence—implicated by third-party consent law). 
260 See supra notes 167–75 and accompanying text.  These sections contemplate the 
possible circumvention of the Randolph approach.  The possibility that more searches 
would be justified despite one co-tenant denying consent is because other factors may work 
to override that denial.  However, police would not circumvent the Randolph standard 
because under the reasonableness approach, the physical location of a potential objector 
would be irrelevant and police would not be able to isolate one co-tenant to silence his or 
her objection.  The reasonableness standard will thus not raise as many individual privacy 
right concerns despite allowing more searches even in the face of a denial of consent, 
because the potential for circumventing the test will be minimized. 
261 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 118 (“[T]he question whether the police might lawfully enter 
over objection in order to provide any protection that might be reasonable is easily 
answered yes.”); see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Privacy as Struggle, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 501, 
508 (2007) (“Roberts likely misread the majority’s rule, which permits warrantless entry 
where there is still some individualized suspicion—reasonable suspicion—such as when 
interspousal domestic violence is suspected.”). 
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This result thus offers the best possible protection to domestic violence 
victims because it allows police entry in some circumstances, while not 
overreaching to allow entry when there is no reason for police to believe 
that domestic violence is likely to occur.262 
In addition to these public policy benefits, the reasonableness 
approach is beneficial in its simplicity for law enforcement officials to 
recall and employ the approach.263  Because it is unlikely that officers 
will have knowledge of the varied and illogical exceptions to third-party 
consent law, the current approach has failed.264  The proposed approach 
is practical because it conforms closely to decisions police officers will 
make in the field regardless of any court holdings on the matter.265  Thus, 
courts will not exclude otherwise legitimately obtained evidence and 
valid arrests because of non-adherence to arbitrary and nonsensical 
rules.266  Clearly, the benefits of consolidating the rules governing third-
party consent into the more logical and intuitive balancing approach 
proposed here will generate positive effects.267 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Flash back to that rainy evening where Officers Donald and Charles 
stand frozen in their tracks, having received contradictory messages 
from the female and male co-tenants on whether the officers may 
                                                 
262 See generally Randolph, 547 U.S. at 119 n.7.  The Court notes this same tension occurs 
between protecting individual privacy rights and domestic violence victims.  The Court 
states that: 
We understand the possibility that a battered individual will be afraid 
to express fear candidly, but this does not seem to be a reason to think 
such a person would invite the police into the dwelling to search for 
evidence against another.  Hence, if a rule crediting consent over 
denial of consent were built on hoping to protect household victims, it 
would distort the Fourth Amendment with little, if any, constructive 
effect on domestic abuse investigations. 
Id. 
263 See supra notes 233–67 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns addressed by, 
and the benefits reaped from, the proposed approach). 
264 See supra Parts II.B–C (explaining the current fact-sensitive rules of third-party consent 
law). 
265 See supra notes 234–40 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of utilizing 
a method that is most conducive to effective and efficient police work). 
266 This statement is based on anecdotal evidence gleaned from the third-party consent 
cases and the general speculation that police are unable to apply the current law; thus, 
otherwise legitimately obtained evidence is being suppressed in court based on 
inconsequential procedural mistakes. 
267 See supra notes 221–66 and accompanying text (contemplating the benefits of replacing 
the current rules with a uniform reasonableness balancing approach). 
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enter.268  At this point, if Officers Donald and Charles were aware of the 
complex rules currently governing third-party consent law, they still 
would be contemplating their response.  The current standard of third-
party consent, derived from Randolph and its predecessors, leaves them 
perplexed as to what rule of law they should apply and whether they 
should enter. 
Fortunately, a new test, the third-party consent reasonableness test, 
is the method for determining the efficacy of consent in Donald’s and 
Charles’s jurisdiction.269  After the initial shock of the contradictory 
sentiments from the co-tenants, Donald and Charles quickly survey the 
situation, noticing the disheveled and flustered look of the female co-
tenant who granted consent and that the man seems to be intoxicated.  
Their minds whirl as they weigh the pertinent factors in the third-party 
consent reasonableness test, and they determine that the balance favors 
granting efficacy to the female tenant’s consent.  They promptly enter 
and discover that their analysis was correct:  they encounter the male co-
tenant, drunken and armed.  The officers cautiously disarm and arrest 
the male co-tenant for spousal abuse. 
As indicated in the above analysis, depending upon several 
variables, Donald and Charles may not have arrested the male co-tenant 
under the current third-party consent law.  Just as likely, without 
understanding the convoluted body of third-party consent law they 
would have made the arrest, but risked having a court suppress evidence 
seized from the arrest. 
Such is the current state of third-party consent law:  unnecessarily 
complex and impractical for police officers to use in the field or for 
courts to apply consistently.  The current law is further problematic 
because of its consequences on important public policy interests.  In light 
of the difficulties in applying the current standard, the flaws in applying 
the standard, and the public policy shortcomings, the Court should 
overrule its current third-party consent law precedent. 
The Court should then elucidate a cohesive reasonableness test to 
replace the erratic current standards, which will contemplate similar 
factors as those discussed in the Randolph dicta.  Incorporated into the 
new test, those factors will provide a unified and more manageable 
approach for police officers and courts to administer the law.  As 
demonstrated by Charles and Donald, such an approach will resolve the 
                                                 
268 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (introducing Donald and Charles and their 
dilemma). 
269 Only for the purposes of this hypothetical example does the proposed third-party 
consent balancing test govern. 
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issues created by the current law, finally resulting in a consistent 
standard for third-party consent law. 
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